Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (Northwestern)
Guns and Violence Symposium, vol. 86, no. 1, 1995
Book Review, 247.
Posted for Educational use only. The printed edition remains canonical. For citational use please visit the local law library or obtain a back issue.

OF GENOCIDE AND DISARMAMENT
Don B. Kates, Jr.
Daniel D. Polsby *

Copyright © 1995 by the Northwestern University School of Law; Don B. Kates & Daniel D. Polsby

LETHAL LAWS. By Jay Simkin, Aaron Zelman & Alan M. Rice. Milwaukee, Wisconsin (1995). 347 Pp.

The thesis of Lethal Laws is that, as a practical matter, governments cannot commit genocide except on effectively disarmed populations. However one appraises the success of the book in developing this theme, one must concede the book's contribution to our knowledge of foreign firearms regulation, which is among the most frequently mentioned, and muddled aspects of our own gun control debate. Pulled together for the first time are lengthy English translations of historical firearm laws from Germany, the USSR, the People's Republic of China, Ottoman Turkey, Guatemala, Uganda and Cambodia--all places in which, during the past 100 years, infamous acts of genocide were perpetrated by agents of the state. There are also facing-page originals of these statutes in their own language. The laws are set in their historical context by brief but illuminating commentaries which often include information on enforcement practices. This commentary, as far as it goes, is balanced. [1] Far from overdramatizing the scale of various genocides, Lethal Laws inclines to settle on the lowest reasonable number of victims. [2] Despite the authors' expressly [Page 248]

Jewish connection, they bend over backwards to avoid demonizing the German people for the Holocaust (blaming the rise of Nazism exclusively on adverse world and local economic conditions and on the post- World War I Versailles Treaty, which they appear to consider harsh and unfair to Germany).

Lethal Laws is the second book from Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership (JPFO) [3] to champion a proposition that is central to the argument against firearms prohibition: that the inclination of sovereign governments to abuse power, including the infliction of geno-politicide upon racial, ethnic and other minorities, constitutes a sound basis for sanctioning an armed population capable of at least rudimentary self-defense. [4] Granting this thesis implicates an extraordinary roster of political sensitivities and cannot judiciously be dismissed out of hand in the closing years of a century that has been the golden age of genocide. Yet it is safe to predict that Lethal Laws will not become the vehicle through which this important public conversation is carried on. The reason for this state of affairs is not to be found in the book but in its authors' inexcusable bad manners, portrayed, for example, in their penchant for renting billboards or placing advertisements in magazines that equate President Clinton, or gun control activists like Sarah Brady, to Hitler. [5] In the best of times this kind of behavior would contribute nothing useful to public debate. In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing and especially in light of the ensuing press coverage, in which libertarians, firearms hobbyists, members of the National Rifle Association, survivalists, skinheads, and neo-Nazis were all jumbled together as a modern version of the Red [Page 249]

Menace, such bombastic comparisons accomplish nothing apart from gravely undermining the credibility of those who are guilty of them. It is unfortunate that this confusion exists because the foreign experience with firearms regulation and armed populations has much to inspire reflection as Americans try to reach some sort of admissible solution for the problem of crime and violence in our society. And on its own merits, Lethal Laws makes a worthwhile contribution to that endeavor.

Arguments about firearms policy often fall back into the fashion of oracular interpretation, in which statistical entrails are examined and pronounced to imply (or not to imply) that gun control laws can lead to lower rates of homicide or suicide or that regional or national differences in patterns of firearms possession explain differences in the incidence of violent crime. The large question that tends to get lost in these minute inquiries is that of the ideal distribution of firearms in a society. Supposing we had a magic spell that allowed us to have whatever world we would like as regards firearms: what world would we choose? No firearms at all? Police and soldiers armed but no one else? Brinks truck drivers also armed? Upon what principles should we draw the line?

The "no firearms at all" option is too swiftly chosen by members of the urban upper-middle and professional classes, for on the one hand, they--that is, we-- seldom encounter problems for which firearms would appear an obvious counter; and on the other hand, as we read in the newspapers every day, firearms-- handguns and assault rifles especially--have become the vectors of one of the major public health problems of our time. Why then should we behave any differently toward firearms than toward the variola virus, which, thanks to a century of unceasing effort, has been extirpated from the earth?

The analogy is seductive but misleading. Without variola there can be no smallpox, but without firearms there can be plenty of violence. For example, the world before firearms was hardly a pacific place. [6] It is unrealistic to expect criminals to become less predatory once their fear of potentially lethal confrontations with firearms is removed. At a minimum, then, it would seem that one should want a police force with access to firearms and for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis) a soldiery is similarly armed. At this point, one has what might be called (with some imprecision) the European paradigm: [7] an [Page 250] armed government and a disarmed population. The question is whether over the long pull this prototype is inherently more irenic with respect to social violence than one in which firearms are more popularly distributed.

Most American gun-phobes clearly prefer the European paradigm for two reasons. First they consider it ludicrous that their own government might become the origin of a secular danger commensurate with armed resistance. [8] Massacres and atrocities have occurred in American history, along with a civil war that was sanguinary even by the standards of its time; but literal genocides have been fairly remote from American history. Second, gun-phobes do not give credence to the prospect that individual precautions, such as being armed, could prove to be cost-effective (in the broadest sense), given that any hypothetical, assumed-to-be pathological government would command a heavily equipped modern army, against which small arms would certainly be helpless.

Such reasons, though they have persuaded many fair-minded people, are unconvincing when looked at closely. It is self-deluding to deliberate the European paradigm without also recognizing its liability--repeated dozens of times in living memory--to tip into genocidal extremity. Genocide is a singular event; as Lethal Laws argues, there are no obvious demographic or socio- psychological predisposing factors, and no reason to suppose that Americans are immune from the craziness that has overtaken countries both rich and poor, urbane and agrarian. Most of the people who were murdered by their own governments in this century would undoubtedly have said, before the fact, that their becoming the victims of any such wholesale mass-atrocities was a simply unthinkable eventuality.

Neither is it necessarily futile for irregular troops to oppose conventional armed forces. Guerrillas have often held their own against regular military formations; and even if their record were significantly weaker than it is, an armed population might possess a sort of general deterrent utility by complicating the calculations and increasing the expected costs of any aspiring junta or intended putsch. Of course this is not to suggest that tyranny inevitably follows from banning civilian firearms possession or that past episodes of genocide would not have occurred, or for that matter that future episodes will not occur, were the victim population armed.

The policy question, rightly considered, is whether the benefits of civilian firearms possession--including their effect in discouraging overreaching by government--are great enough in comparison with [Page 251] the costs to justify allowing (or for that matter compelling) the civilian population to be armed. The answer to this question, though very far from obvious, is crucially important to the long-term welfare of society. Yet giving it detached consideration has been complicated by the airy dismissal of the entire issue by our culture's principal agencies of conventional wisdom. Because low murder rates and restrictive gun control laws have been consecrated as a chain of cause-and-effect by every major newspaper in the country (to say nothing of network television, Time and Newsweek, and so on), it should not be surprising that the foreign experience, especially that in Japan and England, where murder rates are exceptionally low [9] and gun controls strict, [10] should figure prominently in debate. Such ingenuous analogical reasoning persists in newspaper accounts despite the availability since 1992 of David Kopel's prize- winning book, The Samurai, the Mountie and the Cowboy. [11] Examining the experience of England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Jamaica, Switzerland and Japan, Kopel's work raises critical doubts of whether the connection between firearms availability and crime has in fact been uniform enough to allow the standard inference that one leads to the other. Lethal Laws adds further, much needed historical perspective to a different phase of the same question, namely what the foreign experience implies with respect to the contingent costs of firearms non-availability.

Public conversation about firearms policy has not only been vexed by the fascination this subject seems to hold for a number of evidently unstable characters, but also by the tendency of argument in a polemical environment sometimes to substitute facility for precision in setting forth relevant information. Zimring and Hawkins, for example, have made the point that few Israelis own handguns (which they illustrate with a table indicating that handgun ownership is far less in Israel than in Austria or Canada), [12] and that Israel and Switzerland have strict handgun laws and report negligible deaths by handguns. This line of argument, though, says very little about the availability of firearms to the general population. Indeed, as Israeli criminologist Abraham Tennenbaum has written, "the homicide rate in Israel has always been very low much lower than in the United States despite the greater availability of guns to law-abiding Israeli civilians." [13] Relatively few Israelis own guns because any law-abiding Jew who needs an Uzi, or a handgun, may borrow it, like a library book, from an Israeli police armory. In the U.S., far from the state giving firearms to those in need, fully automatic firearms like the Uzi have been stringently controlled since the 1930s, and now the purchase of semi-automatic versions of the Uzi--mere, cosmetic lookalikes of the military weapon--has been banned. [14]

Israelis (including Arabs) who want to own a personal firearm must obtain a license; but this is available, on demand, to any trained, responsible adult. Unlike the United States, where carrying a concealed handgun is illegal in most places and circumstances, in Israel, a permit to possess a firearm is also a permit to carry it, concealed or unconcealed, on one's person. Indeed, authorities recommend that people who own guns should carry them, the better to secure them from thieves or children. As a consequence, any good-sized crowd of people is sure to contain some number of citizens carrying personal weapons, usually concealed. [15] American-style massacres, in which numbers of unarmed victims are shot down before police can arrive, astound Israelis, [16] who note

what occurred at a [crowded venue in] Jerusalem some weeks before the California MacDonald's massacre: three terrorists who attempted to machine- gun the throng managed to kill only one victim before being shot down by handgun-carrying Israelis. Presented to the press the next day, the surviving terrorist complained that his group had not realized that Israeli civilians were armed. The terrorists had planned to machine-gun a succession of crowd spots, thinking that they would be able to escape before the police or army could arrive to deal with them.

Of course one should not impulsively jump to the conclusion that Israeli firearms policy is applicable in detail to the United States, where massacres are fairly uncommon events. Our point is rather that a society that is considering the problem of firearms--whose distribution is, after all, one of the most basic questions of social policy--cannot afford to surrender to the cataracts of misinformation and, one regrets to say, even disinformation that this subject seems almost uniquely to attract.

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Last year's dispiriting congressional debate concerning "assault weapons" furnishes an example. Compared to their proportion of the firearm stock, "assault weapons" are actually under-utilized in crime; even Handgun Control, Inc. has conceded that such firearms are practically never used for criminal purposes. [17] Counterfactual claims to the contrary (in which assault weapons were repeatedly referred to as "the preferred weapons of criminals or dope dealers, etc. "), which were made to bolster the proscription of assault weapons, were allowed to pass from the publicity desks of activist groups or their congressional adjuvants directly into conventional wisdom without having to endure so much as a quizzical smirk from the press corps, let alone the acid bath of skepticism with which they ordinarily greet each new proposed orthodoxy. The New York Times quoted the author of the federal assault weapon ban, Senator Dianne Feinstein, as pointing "out the Steyr AUG, for instance as the 'favorite of drive-by shooters because of its light weight and firepower."' [18] But California law enforcement officials told Daniel Gifford, a free-lance journalist, that there were no more than 10,000 of these weapons in the entire country, mostly owned by peace officers, serious collectors and the movie industry. Subsequent calls to other police agencies across the nation found no one who had ever heard of an AUG being used in a drive-by shooting.

The melodrama of crime stories come-to-life has furnished an irresistible lime-light that even people who know better cannot seem to resist stepping into. Colonel Leonard Supenski of the Baltimore County Police Department, for example, knew exactly how to market his appeal for the enactment of an assault weapons ban a few years ago. He told reporters: "We're tired of passing out flags to the widows of [Baltimore] officers killed by drug dealers with Uzis." [19] The FBI, however, reports that only one officer has ever been killed with an Uzi and that was in Puerto Rico, not Baltimore. Less than 1.5% of police officers killed in the 1980s were killed with any "assault-type [Page 254] weapon." [20] Chicago police department statistics have consistently shown rifles and shotguns of all kinds (not just "assault weapons") involved in less than 3% of the city's murders. [21]

The case for banning military-appearing firearms cannot be made on the basis of their liability to actual criminal misuse. The real basis for banning them lies elsewhere. Though statutory assault weapons are essentially indistinguishable from sporting rifles in terms of how they work, their rate of fire, the class of ammunition they use (and so forth), legislators seem to find something specifically loath-some about a civilian--perhaps one ought to say "mere" civilian--wanting a firearm that is even cosmetically similar to the weapons used by soldiers. Cosmetics lie at the heart of this law. For example, one statutory criterion of an assault rifle is that the weapon possesses a bayonet mount. Yet there seems to be no record of bayoneted rifles ever having been used for crime, at least in this country. Another differentiating criterion is whether the rifle has a pistol grip. But on what theory do pistol grips make a rifle more suited to crime? The concern with bayonet mounts and pistol grips, far from being instrumental, is meant simply to burden the brazenness of people who would dress their rifles in military panoply. In fact, it is a nearly immaculate example of legislation as a form of pure cultural spite--a point that has hardly been lost on those who have been subjected to its strictures.

The important contribution of Lethal Laws is its reminder that the public sector has been by far a greater source of murder in the past 100 years than the private. Not that it is necessarily easy to compare the lives lost because of civilian disarmament and those lost because of the relatively easy availability of firearms, but the raw statistics are admonitory. It is a standard argumentative ploy of gun-phobic legislators to point to the disproportion between lives lost in warfare and civilians back at home shot down by malice or accident. For example, "in the last 25 years more American civilians have died by gunfire murders than were killed in the Vietnam War, the Korean War and World War I combined." [22] Does it not matter to the policy of a liberal state that by far the majority of these deaths were self- inflicted, and a very large proportion involved elderly people? [23] Well and good, perhaps [Page 255] one might think, to deprive despairing people of the means of suicide. But of course firearms bans do not accomplish that; they only place impediments in the way of a preferred means of suicide, obliging the subject to find alternative, perhaps more terrible means. [24] As a preferred public policy, that state of affairs must be argued, not assumed or established by stealthy elision or germane if inconvenient facts--even in a legal system in which suicide has always been disfavored. If one confines one's gaze simply to firearms murders, what one finds is not "gun owners," but rather a small number of aberrant individuals, risk-takers whose life histories are filled with violence, crime, substance abuse, and even serious accidents. [25] On the other hand, genocide has cost the lives of more innocents this century than all the soldiers killed on all sides in all the world's wars in the same period, including not only the two world wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, but the India-Pakistan Wars, the gruesome Iran-Iraq War, all the Arab-Israeli wars, the Falkland War, and the Russo-Afghan fiasco. [26] Likewise, Lethal Laws [27] calculates the total number killed by the Nazi murder machine (exclusive of World War II military casualties) at thirteen million Jews, Gypsies, political opponents, and Polish, Russian and other innocent civilians over the thirteen years from 1933 to 1945--compared with roughly 13,300 Americans murdered annually with guns. [28]

Whether the presence of an armed population would genuinely [Page 256] ameliorate this sort of evil--which is the principal contention of Lethal Laws--is fairly debatable. Unfortunately, fair debate is one thing it almost certainly will not receive, thanks in part to its authors' reputation for personal shrillness. They have nevertheless placed a great deal of new and thought-provoking material at the disposal of a public that has distinct need of reflecting upon it. Perhaps such reflection will occur in a quieter time.

* Attorney and criminologist, Novato, CA and Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, respectively. Thanks for helpful comments to: Professor Robert Cottrol, Rutgers University - Law; Professor Ted Robert Gurr, University of Maryland - Political Science; Professor Barbara Harff, U.S. Naval Academy (Annapolis) - Political Science; Dr. C. Kates, F.A.C.S., Novato, CA; Ms. Marilyn King, Novato, CA; Rudolf J. Rummel, University of Hawaii - Political Science. The authors are sole proprietors of remaining errors.

[1]. For instance, Lethal Laws notes that among the targets of the Cambodian genocide are "all Khmer Muslims (Chads)." JAY SIMKIN ET AL., LETHAL LAWS 314 (1995). Professors Harff and Gurr note that this genocide has been little recognized because it amounted to only about 200,000 deaths (about one- half of the whole Chad people) out of a Cambodian body count that may be as much as 15 times greater. Barbara Harff & Ted Robert Gurr, Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945, 32 INT'L. STUD. Q. 359, 366 (1988).

[2]. Compare LETHAL LAWS, supra note 1, at 315, ("It seems safe to conclude that Pol Pot murdered about one million Cambodians, some 14% of the population."), to Professor Leiser's estimate of "some two to three million" Cambodian deaths. Burton M. Leiser, Victims of Genocide, in DIANE SANK & DAVID I. CAPLAN, TO BE A VICTIM: ENCOUNTERS WITH CRIME AND JUSTICE 278 (1991). See also Harff & Gurr, supra note 2, at 364, (listing the death toll at 800,000 to 3,000,000).

[3]. The first book was JAY SIMKIN & AARON ZELMAN, "GUN CONTROL": GATEWAY TO TYRANNY (1992) [hereinafter "GERMAN GUN CONTROL"].

[4]. See, e.g., David I. Caplin, The Warsaw Ghetto: 10 Handguns Against Tyranny, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1988 (reprinted in NEW DIMENSIONS, special issue 1989); David I. Caplin Weapons Control Laws: Gateways to Oppression and Genocide in SANK & CAPLAN, supra note 2. Note that David I. Caplin, like his wife, Professor Sue Wimmershoff-Caplin, is a member of the NRA national board of directors. See also WAYNE LAPIERRE, GUNS, CRIME AND FREEDOM 166-70 (1994) (LaPierre is the NRA Executive Director); Raymond Kessler, The Ideology of Gun Control, Q.J. IDEOLOGY 381 (1988); Raymond Kessler, Gun Control and Political Power, 5 LAW & POLICY Q. 381 (1983); Elliott Rothenberg, Jewish History Refutes Gun Control Activists, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1988; John Salter, Civil Rights and Self-Defense, AGAINST THE CURRENT, July-Aug. 1988; J. Neil Schulman, Talk at Temple Beth Shir Shalom in J. NEIL SCHULMAN, STOPPING POWER: WHY 70 MILLION AMERICANS OWN GUNS (1994); Stefan Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON CIV. RTS. L.J. 67 (1991) (Tahmassebi is an NRA employee).

[5]. One such advertisement, featuring pictures of Hitler and Mrs. Brady, appears in GERMAN GUN CONTROL, supra note 3, at 133. Another is reported in USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 1994, at A10, depicting Hitler rendering the Nazi salute and bearing the caption: "All in favor of gun control raise your right hand."

[6]. Ted Robert Gurr, Development and Decay: Their Impact on Public Order in Western History, in HISTORY & CRIME: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNAL JUSTICE POLICY 31 (James A. Incardi & Charles E. Tampel eds., 1980).

[7]. James B. Jacobs, Exceptions to a General Prohibition on Handgun Possession: Do They Swallow Up the Rule?, 49 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 19 n.42 (1986).

[8]. See generally B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, 45 PUB. INTEREST 37 (1976).

[9]. 1991 DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, STATISTICAL DIVISION 446 (Japan), 454 (UK-England & Wales) (1991).

[10]. DAVID KOPEL, THE SAMURAI THE MOUNTIE AND THE COWBOY 45, 78 (1992).

[11]. THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY won the 1992 Comparative Criminology Award of the Division of International Criminology of the American Society of Criminology. KOPEL, supra note 10.

[12]. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL 9 (1986).

[13]. Abraham Tennenbaum, Israel Has A Successful Gun Control Policy in CHARLES P. COZIC, GUN CONTROL: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 250 (1992).

[14]. Id. Compare Swiss and Israeli laws and practices cited in Glenn H. Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States' Rights: A Thought Experiment, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) and Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH.L.REV. 203, 249, n.193 (1983) [hereinafter Original Meaning] to Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994) and the newly enacted (v) and 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (1988).

[15]. Tennenbaum, supra note 13, at 248.

[16]. See, e.g., the guest editorial by Israeli criminologist Abraham Tennenbaum, Handguns Could Help, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 26, 1991.

[17]. See, e.g., Osha Gray Davidson, There Ought to Be a Law (But Not This Crime Bill); The Folly of Focusing on 'Assault Weapons,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at A17 (written by an anti-gun advocate); James Jacobs, Assault Rifles Are Bad Targets, NEWSDAY, May 28, 1993, at 58. Chicago Police state that assault-style weapons accounted for only three out of about 2,500 murders reported in the city between 1992 and 1994. John Kass, Daley Beset By Soaring Homicide Rate, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 7, 1994, § 2, at 1.

GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 73 (1991) quotes an HCI spokesman admitting that assault weapons "play a small role in overall violent crime." For a detailed review of the latest studies and statistics nationwide, see Edgar A. Suter, M.D. 'Assault Weapons' Revisited: An Analysis of the AMA Report, 83 MED. J. GA. 281 (1994).

[18]. Philip Weiss, A Hoplophobe Among the Gunnies, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 11, 1994, at 66.

[19]. Sam Fulwood, III., Membership Angry at NRA for Losing Vote in Gun Ban, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1990, at A1.

[20]. Letters from J. H. Wilson, Chief, Uniform Crime Reporting Program to Paul H. Blackman, Research Coordinator of the NRA (June 20 and Sept. 5, 1990).

[21]. Chicago Police Department Murder Analysis Reports, Detective Division Murder Analysis (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

[22]. Taming the Gun Monster that is Consuming America, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993 (unsigned editorial), reprinted in CRIME AND CRIMINALS 159 (Paul A. Winters ed., 1995).

[23]. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1994 NAT'L DATA BOOK 96, Table 128 (1994); see also Garren J. Wintemute, Firearms as a Cause of Death in the United States, 1920-1982, 27 J. TRAUMA 532 (1987).

[24]. It is a point debated in the literature whether rates of suicide in a given culture are instrumentality dependent or independent. Many countries, such as Japan and Hungary, report suicide rates much higher than those in the U.S., even though private possession or ownership of firearms is essentially forbidden. Some commentators believe that if the preferred means of suicide in a given culture could be somehow interdicted, the substitution of other means would not be complete and thus the suicide rate would go down. Similar arguments are commonly made in behalf of gun control as a means of crime control. The premise is far from securely established in either connection. See generally KLECK, supra note 17, at 223-69.

[25]. Chicago Police Department Murder Analysis Reports give the following percentage for offenders who had prior police records: 1993: 71.68%; 1992: 72.39%; 1991: 77.15%; 1990: 74.63%; 1989: 74.22%; 1988: 73.59%; 1987: 73.81%; 1986: 72.20%; 1985: 70.44%; 1984: 69.78%; 1983: 69.57%; 1982: 66.47%. See supra, note 21. D. MULVIHILL ET AL., CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE 532 (1969), shows that 74.7% of murder arrestees over a four year period had priors for violent crime or burglary. In another one year period, 77.9% of murder arrestees had priors. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT-1971, at 38. Over yet another five year period, nationally arrested murderers had adult criminal records showing an average prior criminal career of at least six years duration including four major felony arrests. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT-1975 42ff.

[26]. Harff & Gurr, supra note 1, at 370.

[27]. SIMKIN & ZELMAN, supra note 3, at 149.

[28]. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIM. STATISTICS, FIREARMS AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: SELECTED FINDINGS FROM NATIONAL STATISTICAL SERIES 13 (1994).