Rutgers Law Review (Rutgers-Newark)
Note, 47 (1995): 1503.
Posted for Educational use only. The printed edition remains canonical. For citational use please visit the local law library or obtain a back issue.

LIBERALIZING THE CONCEALED CARRY OF HANDGUNS BY QUALIFIED CIVILIANS: THE CASE FOR "CARRY REFORM"

John C. Lenzen*

Guns are potentially lethal weapons whether wielded by criminals or crime victims. They are frightening and intimidating to those they are pointed at, whether . . . predators or the preyed-upon. Guns thereby empower both those who would use them to victimize and those who would use them to prevent their victimization. Consequently, they are a source of both social order and disorder, depending on who uses them, just as is true of the use of force in general. The failure to fully recognize this can lead to grave errors in devising public policy to minimize violence through gun control.[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

Recent political polls consistently show that voters place violent crime among the issues that most concern them, and many believe that it is out of control in New Jersey.[2] Given [Page 1504] that roughly 88% of all violent crimes occur outside of the victims' homes,[3] there are a number of ways in which the state government can respond. A growing majority of states now allows private citizens to carry concealed handguns ("concealed carry") for the purpose of lawful self-defense.[4] Although [Page 1505] the states differ in the form of their approaches, certain generalizations may be made as to their substance. Most of these states condition concealed carry on the issuance of permits.[5] Applicants for permits in these states are not required to show a need to carry a handgun.[6] Instead, permit applicants gener- [Page 1506] ally qualify to carry handguns by satisfying other statutory criteria and the state governments do not presume to question the necessity of using handguns to defend against contemporary criminal predators. Many of the states have adopted non-discretionary application procedures to ensure uniform enforcement of the specific requirements set forth in their statutes;[7] however, some allow wide discretion at the local level.[8] Permit applicants are generally required to satisfy objective[9] criteria such as background checks, minimum ages, training requirements, which are designed to screen out the untrained, the psychologically unstable and the criminally inclined. Many in New Jersey consider this a radical proposition; however, the sheer frequency with which other jurisdictions are considering and adopting these reforms indicates to the contrary.[10]

Within the last ten years alone, twenty states have adopted [Page 1507] concealed carry permit systems to facilitate more liberal issuance of permits ("carry reform"), bringing the total number of states with comparatively liberal requirements to twenty-eight.[11] Four states enacted reforms in 1994.[12] To date, six states have done so this year.[13] Many others are presently considering reforms.[14] Not a single state with a liberal permit system has repealed its law or added a need requirement.[15] Carry reform is a legislative movement in which the states are unequivocally rejecting the assumption that civilians are incompetent to carry handguns in preparation for the lawful resistance of criminal aggression.[16] New Jersey, however, has [Page 1508] been uncharacteristically conservative in its response to this legal trend.[17] [Page 1509]

Passions tend to run high around the "gun issues," and it may therefore be difficult to convince those with deep-seated negative feelings about guns to support liberalized concealed carry laws.[18] Individuals tend to take widely divergent positions. Some conclude that the only solution to the problem of gun-related crime is the severe restriction of civilian firearm possession.[19] Conversely, others believe that "an absolute" constitutional right to bear arms prohibits all such restrictions.[20] Still others conclude that the only realistic solution, given the unique culture of the United States, is to encourage responsible gun ownership among the population.[21] At any rate, the possibility that private citizens might be empowered to, where appropriate, lawfully resist armed aggression with equal force makes some people uncomfortable.[22] [Page 1510]

Consequently, opponents to carry reform advance a number of arguments: that everyone will be armed and we will be surrounded by people "packing heat" (generally accompanied by a disparaging remark about the "wild west"); that ordinary arguments will escalate into shootouts, that those who are armed will "look for trouble" or be more aggressive than usual; that innocent bystanders will be shot by irresponsible armed civilians; and that it is statistically safer not to resist crimes than to do so with a handgun. Not one of these claims is empirically sound in light of recent statistical evidence and the experiences of the carry reform states. Others fear that civilians with carry permits will act as judge, jury and executioner, and that the reforms will cultivate a vigilante mentality among the population. Carry reform, however, would not give permit holders the freedom to behave as these skeptics suggest without threat of the most severe criminal punishment.[23] Given the specific group whose behavior will be affected by the reforms, it is highly unlikely that this prediction will come to fruition. Still others attempt to minimize the utility of using [Page 1511] handguns in self-defense against street crimes.[24] Assuming, arguendo, that this premise is true, it falls far short of condemning carry reform as poor public policy. Rather, it merely emphasizes the need for thorough and effective training.[25]

The issue of private gun ownership in general is beyond the scope of this Article. Nor does this Article debate the inherent moral and philosophical judgments made when considering the use of force on the individual or societal level.[26] Rather, this [Page 1512] Article seeks to examine the possibility of carry reform in New Jersey in light of the current legal environment and recent social science data from the standpoint of public safety and crime control. The premise that trained, objectively screened civilians generally cannot be trusted with handguns is not only unjustified on an empirical level, but may be counterproductive to the goal of reducing criminal violence. The most effective means of reducing the incidence of violent crime might possibly be empowerment of victims to use justifiable force[27] in self- [Page 1513] defense, stopping crimes before they are consummated. Thus, potential victims might prevent their own victimization.

The empirical evidence from those states with liberal concealed carry laws strongly suggests that carry reform in New Jersey would not threaten public safety. Other data indicate that more prevalent concealed carry may be a powerful weapon in the fight against violent crime in two ways: (1) empowering individuals to defend against violent crime; and (2) deterring the commission of violent crimes in general.[28] First, the carrying of firearms by qualified civilians enables individuals to stop some crimes from being committed.[29] Certainly there are instances in which it does not matter whether one is armed, for example, when a victim cannot draw his or her handgun safely. In these cases, the mere possession of a handgun does not force the victim to do anything unwise or unsafe. An armed victim is as free as an unarmed victim to succumb to the perpetrator. There are times, however, when victims may resist safely. Concealed carry reform empowers people to decide, rationally, when and where to resist.[30] [Page 1514]

Second, there is a sizable body of empirical evidence indicating that widespread concealed carry may have a deterrent effect on violent crime by causing criminals to fear that their intended victims might resist with swift and deadly force.[31] Statistical data indicate that private citizens already use firearms to justifiably kill significant numbers of felons.[32] Quasi-experimental evidence illustrates that well publicized campaigns to increase the perception that the general population is armed correlate strongly with reductions in certain violent crimes.[33] Finally, survey data gathered from incarcerated felons show that criminals are well aware of the danger posed by armed victims and adjust their behavior accordingly.[34] Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests that more widespread and well-publicized concealed carry may reduce the rates of violent crime by deterring criminal behavior.

A legislative change in New Jersey's concealed carry permit requirements is in order.[35] The people of other states have shown unequivocally that they may be trusted to carry handguns. New Jersey residents deserve the same chance. Ideally, the subjective need requirement should be eliminated in favor of heightened objective screening and training requirements. [Page 1515] This Article concludes by highlighting certain substantive recommendations as to the possible form of the new law derived largely from a review of the statutory provisions of other states. If New Jersey acts quickly, it can still serve as a model for the dwindling number of states that have yet to enact the reforms. The opportunity to legislate at the forefront of this trend, however, is long past.

II. NEW JERSEY'S CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION

New Jersey law currently provides for the issuance of concealed carry permits.[36] Although on its face the section appears to allow permits for civilians, issuance is conditioned on the applicants demonstrating a "justifiable need" to carry a handgun.[37] Citing a legislative intent to regulate handguns[38] and public policy,[39] the New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted the need requirement so that permits are effectively inaccessible to the general public. As revealed by the cases, concealed carry permits are not granted to civilians, even if they have genuine, reasonable and routine fears for their own safety.

Many might assume that small business owners who carry large amounts of cash to the bank on a nightly basis are entitled to carry a handgun for self-defense. This is not the case. [Page 1516] In 1971, the court set the tone for placing severe restrictions on the issuance of permits by consolidating three permit denial appeals and affirming them on the same day.[40] In Siccardi v. State,[41] a theater manager applied for a carry permit claiming that he was required to transport substantial sums of money to a bank depository at night, that the theater was located in a high crime area, that numerous beatings and robberies had occurred in that area, and that he had received threats via telephone, in the theater and in the street.[42] The court was unimpressed with the applicant's showing of need.[43] Instead of granting the application, Justice Jacobs, writing for a unanimous court, used the opinion to lecture on the evils of carrying firearms for self-defense[44] and their alleged relative uselessness in deterring and stopping of crimes.[45] In apparent contradiction to these premises, the court failed to distinguish the carrying of firearms by police and security guards.[46] In fact, [Page 1517] the court suggested that what the applicant was apparently incompetent to do for himself he could request of the police, or hire security guards to do for him.[47]

Additionally, the court felt that the statutorily unauthorized practices of local police agencies in denying permit applications were instructive in interpreting the need requirement.[48] The [Page 1518] court cited one 1969 study for the proposition that carrying handguns would not be of use to civilians for self-defense against street crimes.[49] The authors of the report, however, merely noted that no data existed at that time to establish their effectiveness.[50] This is no longer the case; much evidence [Page 1519] now supports handgun self-defense utility, both empirical and anecdotal.[51] In fact, the court seemed to indicate that no civilian should even be permitted to own a gun without showing a need to do so.[52] Of course, this was not relevant in determining whether the applicant had demonstrated a need for a carry permit, but it did illustrate the court's hostility to civilian firearm possession, even for lawful purposes. The court added, quite paternalistically, that the carrying of a handgun by the applicant "would involve him in the known and serious dangers of misuse and accidental use."[53]

Finally, the court expressed its concern that a holding that the applicant was entitled to a permit would apply as well to the "innumerable men in business who are obliged to carry funds and whose psychologically felt needs [i.e., fear of crime] [Page 1520] are no less than his."[54] To this prediction, the court added: "Surely such widespread handgun possession in the streets, somewhat reminiscent of frontier days, would not be at all in the public interest."[55] As noted earlier, and as will be discussed more fully in this Article, the fear that liberally available permits will become widespread is statistically untenable; a very small percentage of the population may be expected to apply for permits.[56] Furthermore, those individuals who do apply for permits may be characterized as overwhelmingly law-abiding.[57]

Ultimately, the court endorsed a strict policy which confines the issuance of carry permits to applicants involved in "security work" and other civilians with an "urgent necessity" to carry handguns for self-defense.[58] This urgent necessity, the court noted, might be established by one "whose life is in real danger, as evidenced by serious threats or earlier attacks."[59] Those concerned with protecting their property, "protectible by other means," do not qualify.[60]

The court decided two other cases that day, both of which affirmed the denial of permit applications based on the restrictive principles handed down in Siccardi.[61] In In re X,[62] the court held that a diamond dealer, who regularly carried loose diamonds on his person and had maintained carry permits for the previous five years, had failed to show a sufficient need for a permit.[63] In Reilly v. State,[64] the court upheld the denial of permit applications to a number of doctors (all of whom previ- [Page 1521] ously held permits) whose practices required them to carry bags of narcotics into dangerous urban areas at very late hours.[65] One of the doctors had a previous confrontation with "hoodlums," and another had been forced to draw his previously licensed handgun to prevent an assault.[66]

Every subsequently published decision in New Jersey has resulted in the denial of permit applications except for applications specifically for job-related security purposes.[67] After Siccardi, the dearth of carry permits is hardly surprising.[68] In 1990, the court had an opportunity to reexamine the issue in In re Preis,[69] but failed to relax the need requirement. Both applicants were former police officers, employed by private detective agencies that were hired to protect a tugboat company during a labor dispute.[70] An unknown individual had already shot out a tugboat window.[71] The court unanimously held that even employees of a security company cannot be granted permits absent a showing that their duties present a "substantial threat of serious bodily harm" and that the carrying of a handgun is "necessary to reduce the threat of unjustifiable serious bodily harm to any person."[72] According to the court, "a need to protect property alone" is insufficient to establish a justifiable need to carry a handgun.[73] The court rein- [Page 1522] stated the trial court's denial of their applications.[74] [Page 1523]

Evidently the court is of the opinion that residents of New Jersey cannot be trusted to carry handguns¾not even those who have passed background checks and are thoroughly familiar with their use.[75] Due to the court's restrictive interpretation of the need standard, few civilians, if any, can acquire a permit to carry a handgun in their daily lives, regardless of the dangers they must face.

III. POLICE PROTECTION AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

Authorities frequently advise that in emergency situations, for example when one realizes that the commission of a violent crime is imminent or already in progress, the best avenue is to dial "911." Mounting evidence suggests that the 911 system, while arguably an improvement over the alternative, is still much less than satisfactory.[76] The response time for 911 calls indicates that the system may be effectively useless for stopping crimes in progress. In 1992, for example, the police responded within five minutes to only 29% of all calls reporting crimes of violence.[77] Unfortunately, "as quickly as they can" is often not nearly quick enough for someone faced with the threat of imminent criminal attack.[78] Even a five minute wait may seem like, and often is, a lifetime.

Furthermore, the chances of successfully maintaining a claim against a police department for its failure to respond in time are extremely poor. Individual protection is not the purpose of maintaining police forces,[79] and the police generally have no duty to protect individuals from criminal aggres- [Page 1524] sion.[80] Under New Jersey's Tort Claims Act ("Act"),[81] the police are immune from liability for their failure to provide protection and failure to arrest or detain dangerous criminals.[82] The cases interpreting the Act have consistently refused to hold police liable for their failure to assist individuals[83] absent some special relationship which might justify the imposition of a duty to do so.[84] Usually the only way in which a duty arises on the part of the police is if they do respond.[85] There- [Page 1525] fore, it may be argued that if the existing tort system has any behavioral effect on police, it is to discourage them from responding to calls for help.

The immunity from suit conferred on police makes sense. The police are neither omniscient, omnipresent nor omnipotent. They simply cannot be everywhere at once to stop all crimes, especially since criminals generally make a concerted effort not to commit crimes when the police are present.[86] Most crime victims must face their aggressors alone and with no assistance from the police.[87] Allowing for tort liability against police because they were not present to stop crimes would effectively impose a duty upon them that they could not possibly satisfy. Instead, the law recognizes that it is each individual's responsibility to ensure his or her own safety. Yet, strangely, New Jersey's current law denies individuals the ability to effectively provide for their safety outside of their homes, where the vast majority of violent crimes occur.[88] This is especially true in the case of women, who are, on average, physically weaker than the predatory males who victimize them. The lack of police responsibility for individual protection is arguably rational. Where the state mandates that individuals take responsibility for their own safety, however, it seems inconsistent at best to deny them the ability to exercise that responsibility.

IV. GROUPING THE POPULATION THROUGH DEDUCTIVE ANALYSIS

The penalties for carrying a handgun without a permit in New Jersey are relatively lenient,[89] especially when compared to those imposed under the Graves Act, which mandates very stiff penalties for crimes committed with firearms.[90] Carrying [Page 1526] a handgun without a permit is only a third degree crime,[91] which is equivalent to a high misdemeanor.[92] New Jersey employs code sentencing, and gives trial judges only limited discretion when imposing sentences.[93] Theoretically, were a person to be convicted of illegally carrying a concealed handgun, the sentence could be three to five years imprisonment,[94] with a maximum fine of $7,500.[95] Realistically, though, these maximum penalties are far from certain.

Plea bargaining to a lower offense or a guarantee of a non-custodial term is generally an option. For those charged with illegally carrying a handgun and who otherwise have clean criminal records, pretrial intervention may be available.[96] Upon successful completion of the program, which generally resembles probation, no conviction results; the charges are dropped and the participant's criminal record remains clean.[97] Additionally, first time offenders enjoy a presumption of non-imprisonment, even upon a full conviction of this offense.[98]

Moreover, it is presently legal to kill, under some circumstances, to protect life or to resist violent crime under the long-standing principle[99] of justification.[100] Consequently, illegal concealed carry for the purpose of lawful self-defense does not expose one to enhanced penalties for the possession of a firearm "for an unlawful purpose."[101] Therefore, New Jersey already permits the act of justifiably defending oneself with a handgun outside the home; it is only the preparation to do so [Page 1527] that the state prohibits.

No evaluation of the efficacy of legislation would be complete without an analysis of those whose behavior the law can be expected to affect. Some groups will not modify their behavior in response to a change in the law. Consequently, they are irrelevant to a discussion of the merits of that change. In evaluating the wisdom of liberalizing New Jersey's concealed carry permit system, one must isolate a target group willing to carry handguns legally, but unwilling to break the current law against doing so.[102] For purposes of analyzing the possible effect of carry reform in New Jersey, four basic and mutually exclusive groups need to be examined.[103] Of these, three groups will not modify their behavior significantly in response to the reform.

The first group is comprised of individuals with no interest in carrying handguns, whether it be a realistic legal option or not. This does not necessarily imply that they are completely unarmed. Certainly, some do not carry anything with which to repel an attacker. Others, however, have decided and will continue to believe that some less lethal weapon is the right choice for their self-defense. Some people have philosophical objections to the use of deadly force under any circumstances, or fear risks they believe are inherent in carrying handguns to repel criminals.[104] Others do not perceive a serious criminal threat. Still others believe that the idea of carrying a handgun for self-defense is simply repulsive. This is by far the largest group in the population,[105] and its members will not alter their behavior in response to the reform. This group will con- [Page 1528] tinue to go about without handguns as always, even in possible fear for their safety.

The second group is composed of violent criminal predators who currently break laws against committing violent crimes on a regular basis. It is not reasonable to expect that the prohibition on unlicensed concealed carry deters significant numbers of serious violent criminals from carrying handguns at this time. The penalties for illegally carrying a handgun pale by comparison to those for the commission of violent crimes, especially where a handgun is used.[106] Violent criminals are apparently not deterred from committing much more serious crimes, many of which involve handguns and the attendant risk of enhanced penalties. In all likelihood, members of this group will continue to illegally transport weapons to the scenes of the crimes they commit if that is their choice. Therefore, their behavior has no place in a discussion of the merits of carry reform, because a change in the law will not significantly affect their deviant pattern of behavior. In short, this group is the problem.

Unfortunately, many with very real fears for their personal safety may feel forced by the present regime to break the law on a constant basis.[107] The penalties for unlicensed concealed carry provide little deterrence to individuals who believe their lives are truly in danger.[108] The people who obey the laws against violent crimes, but are not deterred from illegal concealed carry by the weak or illusory penalties imposed therefore, constitute the third group.[109] They will not alter their [Page 1529] behavior as a result of a change in the law because they are currently motivated to defend themselves and will do so even if it means breaking the law. It is likely that many of them may apply for, and be granted, permits under a more liberal system, but their behavior will not change. They will continue to obey the laws against committing violent crimes, but carry handguns for protection, whether their actions are legal or not.

The fourth group is the only one comprised of individuals whose behavior will be significantly affected by carry reform. This group is composed of those who would carry handguns if it were legal, but are presently deterred from doing so by the current law. Many, if not most, of these people would like to carry handguns because they already fear for their lives. Members of this group are therefore presently obeying the law to the perceived detriment of their own personal safety. It would be unreasonable to posit that they would be undeterred by laws against higher crimes were the prohibition against concealed carry to be lifted. An individual without a criminal record who is caught carrying a concealed handgun illegally will not likely be convicted,[110] much less imprisoned.[111] This provides little threat of punishment for those with records clean enough to pass the background check which could be, and currently is, required of all permit applicants. Yet they obey the law anyway. It is therefore highly unlikely that members of this group would commit unjustifiable intentional homicides even if they were presented with an enhanced opportunity to do so. This group is the only one whose handgun carrying behavior can reasonably be expected to change as a result of carry reform.

If the fourth group is the target group of carry reform, deductive reasoning indicates that society should not fear for their instability and/or disrespect for the law. They obviously hold even the more insignificant of criminal laws in high esteem. As a group, they are characterized by the most reverent [Page 1530] respect for the law, and are, by definition, some of New Jersey's finest citizens and greatest assets. Therefore, the state's current carry restrictions must be motivated primarily by a generalized fear that incompetent or overenthusiastic civilians will threaten public safety by using their handguns irresponsibly. The data from other states which have experienced carry reform indicate that these fears are not well grounded in reality. Furthermore, one would think that careful screening through criminal and psychological background checks and thorough training would address these concerns more precisely than a blanket prohibition on the carrying of handguns by all non-police without regard to their individual characteristics.

V. EMPIRICAL DATA SUGGESTING THAT CARRY REFORM MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL: SELF-DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE

There are two basic theories regarding the benefits of widespread concealed carry by civilians. First, it is believed that handguns are useful in self-defense. Second, states may hope that widespread concealed carry generally deters violent criminals from victimizing the public.[112] There is empirical evidence to support both theories.

A. The Value of Handguns in Self-Defense

As a threshold matter, it is important to debunk the assertions that handguns are not only ineffective for stopping crimes but are also unsafe as tools for self-defense. Recent evidence shows that those armed with handguns succeed in repelling criminals, regardless of how they are armed, approximately 84% of the time.[113] Other data indicate that individuals who resist crimes with guns are approximately 50% less likely to be injured than victims who simply submit.[114] By contrast, resisters armed with knives are "more likely to suffer injury than non-resisters and much more likely to be injured [Page 1531] than gun armed resisters."[115] Furthermore, resistance with a gun compares favorably with other forms of resistance.[116] Victims who use guns to resist crimes generally prevent their completion and are usually not injured in so doing.[117] In not more than 1% of civilian gun resistances is the criminal able to take the gun from the victim.[118] Specifically, victims using guns to resist robbers are less likely to lose their property than those who do nothing at all.[119] Additionally, for both robbery and assault, victims who use guns are less likely to be attacked or injured than non-resisters.[120] Therefore, not only are handguns highly effective in foiling crimes in progress, but the act of resisting with a handgun, in appropriate situations, is actually safer than giving the criminal everything he demands without offering any resistance.

Counting justifiable shootings, among other things, may be a tempting way to calculate the overall value of handguns to society. This method, however, creates the danger that the researcher will only categorize justifiable killings by gun-armed defenders as "defensive uses."[121] The vast majority of defensive handgun uses, including those by the rare individuals who carry legally in states which allow them to do so, do not involve the shooting (much less the killing) of crimi- [Page 1532] nals.[122] Further, in considering the defensive uses of guns, attention must be given to the fact that most violent crimes in the United States occur outside the home,[123] where most private citizens need permits to carry handguns.[124] Even in the states that offer carry permits, very few private citizens obtain them.[125] Additionally, in many instances armed civilians decide not to resist crimes, possibly because resistance would be ill-advised.[126] Therefore, in only a very small percentage of attempted crimes which involve the legal and circumstantial opportunity to resist with a firearm does the victim actually decide to resist.

Surprisingly, the ownership and use of handguns for defensive purposes has gone largely unnoticed by scholars.[127] Presently, there exist only three published estimates of the frequency of the lawful use of firearms to resist crimes.[128] In 1988, Gary Kleck published a study which used survey data collected by "anti-gun"[129] groups[130] to establish that private citizens use handguns to defend against approximately 645,000 [Page 1533] crimes per year.[131] He concluded that the best available evidence suggests that handguns are used as often for defensive purposes as for criminal purposes.[132] Additionally, Kleck noted that over 98% of defensive uses involve only warning shots or displays of a gun and do not result in killings. [133] Of the remaining 2% of defensive uses in which it is necessary to shoot the criminal, most of those shootings do not result in the criminal's death.[134]

Kleck reexamined the issue in 1991.[135] Performing a similar analysis, he estimated a similar frequency of defensive handgun uses. He considered data from eight national or statewide surveys which asked the adult respondents about their defensive gun use.[136] Although the survey methodologies differed in many ways, their results were roughly compara- [Page 1533] ble.[137] Kleck argued that two surveys, in particular, were the most informative.[138] One was the 1981 Hart poll discussed supra.[139] The other was a 1990 Mauser survey.[140] He felt that these surveys shared a number of useful characteristics.[141] Namely, they both covered a national population, asked about gun uses during specific time periods, asked the questions of all respondents, distinguished military and police experiences, and distinguished uses against animals from uses against human aggressors.[142] Kleck concluded that the more recent Mauser survey confirmed the results of the previous Hart poll,[143] and noted that another survey yielded an estimated 1.2 million defensive handgun uses annually.[144]

Kleck's findings and methodologies are not without their critics.[145] The third published estimate on the lawful defensive uses of firearms, The Incidence of Civilian Defensive Firearm Use, based its study on National Crime Victimization Surveys ("NCVS") taken between 1987 and 1990.[146] This work criticized the Kleck Studies because his samples were not as large as the one used in the NCVS.[147] The authors concluded that, between 1987 and 1990, approximately 65,000 incidents occurred annually in which victims used guns to defend against criminals.[148] Consequently, they argued that Kleck overestimated the incidence of defensive gun use.[149] The authors boldly claimed that "(t)he NCVS is the most satisfactory available source of information about defensive firearm use."[150] They also noted, however, a number of possible problems with their study, some of which Kleck predicted.[151] Ultimately, they concluded that the NCVS "almost certainly under-estimates the frequency of firearm self-defense."[152] Even assuming their conclusions are correct (as opposed to Kleck's much greater numbers), the frequency with which gun-wielding victims foil crimes is surprising. This is especially so considering that most crimes occur outside of the home,[153] where armed civilians are rare in liberal carry states, as well as in their restrictive counterparts.[154]

B. The Value of Concealed Carry as a Deterrent to Crime

Substantial evidence exists which suggests that criminals have good reason to fear armed victims. The Federal Bureau of Investigation now collects statistics on the number of justifiable homicides which occur nationwide.[155] This data indicates [Page 1536] that armed private citizens justifiably kill felons nearly as often as do police.[156] Private citizens may actually kill from 30% more to 300% more violent felons than do the police. [157] At any rate, it cannot be denied that Americans shoot criminals with remarkable frequency.[158] Other data suggests that criminals are well aware of this danger, and modify their behavior in response. "That victim gun use may be one of the most serious risks a criminal faces is only beginning to be recognized."[159]

The doctrine of deterrence states that punishment will deter in proportion to its certainty, severity and celerity (promptness).[160] Considering these factors, the available evidence suggests that gun ownership among potential crime victims has as much, if not more, of an effect on violent crime than the activities of the entire criminal justice system.[161] Defensive gun use is roughly as frequent as arrests for violent crime and burglary, and is "substantially more probable than conviction or incarceration."[162] Additionally, the potential severity of victim response is much greater than that of the legal system.[163] Burglars, robbers and murderers are likely to face only a few years in prison. Executions are fairly rare. "In contrast, thousands of criminals are killed by gun-wielding private citizens every year."[164] Finally, victims react in minutes, if not sec- [Page 1537] onds.[165] Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of our lumbering criminal justice system.

Quasi-experimental evidence also indicates strong support for the deterrence theory.[166] In particular, a number of areas outside of New Jersey have attempted to increase "gun awareness" among criminals by heavily publicizing civilian gun training programs.[167] In Orlando, Florida, from October, 1966 to March, 1967, the police department trained more than 2,500 women to use guns in response to public concern over increases in rape.[168] The program was co-sponsored by a local newspaper, which gave it several front-page stories.[169] Rapes declined by 88% in 1967 from 1966; this was a reduction far larger than that experienced in any previous one-year period.[170] Burglary, the crime most likely to occur where victims have access to guns, also dropped significantly during this period.[171]

A similar, but less ambitious program was instituted in Kansas City from September through November, 1967, in response to an increase in commercial robberies.[172] From 1967 to 1968, the robbery rate remained basically constant in Kansas City, and declined by 13% in the surrounding areas.[173] The results were more encouraging than this might indicate because they occurred in the middle of a strong upward trend outside of the area: The robbery rate increased by 35% in Missouri, 20% in the region, and 30% nationwide during the same period.[174]

Finally, in 1982, Kennesaw, Georgia passed an ordinance requiring the head of every household to keep at least one firearm in the home.[175] Kennesaw is a very small town, hav- [Page 1538] ing a population of roughly 5,100 at the time.[176] The town, however, had forty-five burglaries the previous year.[177] The year following enactment of the ordinance, the number of burglaries dropped to only five, a decrease of 89%, which far exceeded the decreases experienced in the state, region and nation (10.4%, 6.8%, and 9.6%, respectively) during the same period.[178] Admittedly, the data from Kennesaw is subject to criticism because of the small size of the sample. The results of this quasi-experiment, however, are entirely consistent with efforts to deter criminal behavior in the other areas surveyed herein using "gun awareness" programs.

Survey data gathered from incarcerated felons also supports the theory that the private use of guns exerts tremendous pressure on the behavior of criminals. In research sponsored by the United States Department of Justice,[179] 1,874 imprisoned felons in ten states were interviewed and were asked about their experiences with armed victims and their attitudes about those experiences.[180] The study asked their responses to a number of questions; some of the more salient results follow. About 56% agreed that "a criminal is not going to mess around with a victim he knows is armed with a gun."[181] Roughly 81% felt that "[a] smart criminal always tries to find out if his potential victim is armed."[182] Approximately 57% believed that "(m)ost criminals are more worried about meeting an armed victim than they are about running into the police."[183] Furthermore, 74% agreed that "(o)ne reason burglars avoid houses when people are at home is that they fear being shot during the crime," and 58% thought that "(a) store owner who is known to keep a gun on the premises is not going to get robbed very often."[184] Among those who had encountered an armed [Page 1539] victim, 45% thought about being shot regularly, and so did 28% of those who had not had such an encounter.[185] In terms of measuring their actual experiences with armed victims, 37% said that they had faced a victim who was armed with a gun. A slightly smaller percentage, 34%, said that they had been "scared off, shot at, wounded or captured by an armed victim," and fully 69% had an acquaintance who had been. About 40% had at least once decided not to commit a crime because they believed the intended victim was armed.[186]

The statistical evidence of the frequency of justifiable homicides by civilians, quasi-experimental evidence of high profile "gun awareness" programs and survey data collected from professional criminals is strikingly consistent. All of the evidence suggests strongly that civilian gun ownership, and criminal awareness thereof, exerts a deterrent effect on violent criminals. To the extent this ownership and awareness becomes more widespread, it appears to correlate with reductions in at least some particular forms of crime. Therefore, not only does the possession of firearms by the pool of potential victims allow those individuals to effectively and safely repel attackers, but widespread concealed carry may actually have a general deterrent effect on the behavior of violent criminals. Furthermore, the surveys of both civilians and criminals indicate that the defensive use of handguns is much more common than was previously thought. As at least one commentator has noted, "[i]t may tentatively be concluded that guns are used more often to prevent the commission of crimes than by felons attempting them."[187]

VI. THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHER STATES: CARRY REFORM WOULD NOT THREATEN PUBLIC SAFETY

What New Jersey apparently lacks in vision, it enjoys in the form of data from other states which have already enacted carry reform. One might think that a state with a historically high rate of homicide and violent crime would be more vulnerable to an increase in violent behavior when greater numbers [Page 1540] of citizens are allowed to carry handguns. For this reason, Florida may be a useful state to examine.[188] Additionally, Florida has been the subject of intensive academic study.[189] Finally, state-tabulated statistics exist for Florida, setting forth an accurate and presumably unbiased account of the outcome of its carry reform.[190] An evaluation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports reveals that Florida's experience did not result in any of the doomsday predictions which were put forth prior to the reform. To the contrary, Florida's experience provides clear and convincing evidence that carry reform poses no threat to public safety, and actually correlates with a sharp decline in Florida's murder rate relative to the national rate.

With regard to the prediction that carry reform will usher in a revival of the "wild west" and result in a majority of the population arming themselves, Florida's carry reform initiative certainly did not have that effect. Florida is a state which had a population of roughly 13,679,000 in 1993.[191] Since the law became effective in 1987, only 193,105 applications for new permits have been received, representing approximately 1.4% of the population over that period.[192] Therefore, by far the [Page 1541] largest group in Florida's population is not interested in carrying handguns, even when presented with the opportunity of doing so legally. The state reports that only 152,143 licenses are presently valid, representing 1.1% of the state's population.[193] Apparently, although most of Florida's adult population is eligible for carry permits, very few are sufficiently motivated to tackle the requirements and expense of obtaining one.[194] "Dodge City" it is not.

Further, of all the applications received by the state since the new law took effect, only 663 have been denied because the applicants had criminal records, roughly .24% of all applications received.[195] Thus, it cannot be said that the people who would apply to legally carry handguns are generally criminally deviant. Predictions that permit holders would commit crimes with their handguns have been proven utterly false;[196] the to- [Page 1543] tal number of Florida permits which have been revoked because of the commission of a crime with a firearm since 1987 is 23.[197] This number represents an astoundingly small and statistically insignificant percentage of the permits issued in that period of time, only .008%. Further, it is likely that at least some of those "crimes" did not involve violence of any kind.[198] The Florida statistics clearly support the hypothesis that those who wish to carry legally are, for the most part, law-abiding citizens.

The relative infrequency with which citizens in Florida take advantage of the carry reform has bearing on the deterrent value of that reform, and probably explains the lack of significant state-wide reductions in violent crime rates correlating with the adoption of these policies. There are at least two reasons for this. First, where a crime is foiled, and the criminal is generally not shot in the process,[199] there is no reason to believe that he will not simply look for a more passive victim and try again. Second, the data from Florida indicates that, whatever else may be said about carry permits, they are uncommon. There may be a deterrent value to widespread and well publi- [Page 1544] cized concealed carry programs, but the states apparently have not yet issued permits on a widespread basis. The sheer random chance of finding an armed victim is so slim that the deterrent value of the permits may currently be limited. Other data indicate that to maximize the deterrent value of carry reform, it should at least be well publicized.[200] This would not be difficult to accomplish in New Jersey.

The trend with respect to Florida's murder rate is most interesting. Fears that the state's murder rate would increase with carry reform, already unlikely in light of the permit statistics supra, have not materialized; instead, they have been conclusively rebuffed. When analyzing the crime rate of any state, it is useful to do so as a percentage of the respective national rate.[201] As noted above, Florida has had a higher murder rate than the rest of the nation since at least 1975.[202] When this murder rate is charted as a percentage of the national annual rate for each year, a trend rapidly becomes evident.[203] From 1975 to the year in which the carry reform took effect, 1987, the rate varies fairly smoothly between 118% and 157% of the national rate.[204] However, the curve turns sharply and consistently downward after 1987.[205] Calculated as a percentage of the national rate, Florida's murder rate was: 137% in 1987, 136% in 1988, 128% in 1989, 114% in 1990, and fell below the national average to 96% in 1991.[206] Florida's rate dropped again in 1992 and 1993, to 9.0 and 8.9, respec- [Page 1545] tively, per 100,000 residents.[207] The national rate dropped from 9.8 in 1991 to 9.3 in 1992 and then rose to 9.5 in 1993.[208] Consequently, Florida's 1993 murder rate was only 94% of the national average.

It should not be denied that something inspiring has occurred in Florida, and that the reduction in the state's murder rate, relative to the national rate, correlates directly with the enactment of carry reform there. Performing the same analysis for the seven other states which enacted reforms between 1985 and 1990 yields no trend as strong: their murder rates either declined, but not as sharply, or did not change significantly, relative to past fluctuations.[209] Therefore, to the extent the experiences of the reform states are instructive, they suggest only beneficial changes from the reforms.

Because Florida's violent crime problem is so severe, it is reasonable to believe that if any residents would have a desire to carry handguns, those living in Florida would. Assuming Florida's numbers as reported by the state[210] are representa- [Page 1546] tive of the other states requiring background checks for permits, it can be concluded that permit holders are so rare that it is unlikely that they provide a general deterrent value at this time. Similarly, it would be premature at this point to conclude that Florida's carry reform caused the severe drop in the state's relative murder rate, although the events do directly correlate. The question whether carry reform may be expected to lower crime rates must be reserved until a state experiences more widespread interest in the permits. It can, however, be concluded that predictions that carry reform will result in increasing homicide rates have been emphatically disproved. This is not an issue which must be debated in the hypothetical anymore. Compelling statistical evidence from the reform states now exists which indicates that permit holders have shown themselves to be thoroughly trustworthy and do not represent any danger to public safety.

VII. SUGGESTED REFORM PROVISIONS

The following are a number of suggestions regarding the form of the proposed non-discretionary permit system. As a threshold matter, of the three current requirements, only the background check[211] should be retained. The burden should [Page 1547] be on the state to show that the applicant does not satisfy the specific requirements. The "justifiable need" requirement[212] must be eliminated. Finally, fears of the overanxious and/or the untrained are probably more effectively addressed by including more comprehensive training requirements in an effort to educate permit holders, rather than to assume that non-police are incapable of handling firearms for self-defense safely and responsibly. It could be argued that what distinguishes the reliability of police from that of the general population is screening, training and testing. More specific recommendations follow.

A. Privatized Training for Proficiency in Gun Handling and Knowledge of the Law of Justification[213]

The state could allow private organizations to apply to have their training programs approved by the state for the educa- [Page 1548] tion and testing of applicants in both handgun handling proficiency (to ensure minimum levels of accuracy and safety) and knowledge of the law of justification.[214] Applicants would pay the organizations directly, and submit certifications of satisfactory completion with their application materials. The state could develop legal educational materials and make uniform learning packages and tests available to these organizations. The legal training should include both criminal and civil implications of using deadly force.[215] Additionally, it should call [Page 1549] the applicants' attention to the extent to which their homeowners or personal liability insurance may or may not provide for indemnity and defense in connection with civil suits arising out of the use of deadly force.[216] Privatization of the permit process would place the economic cost of training and testing primarily on those who seek carry permits. Therefore, it would neither strain the state's resources, nor require other taxpayers to subsidize the acquisition of permits by others.

B. Periodic Testing and Retraining to Maintain Permits

New Jersey does not currently require any retesting or retraining in order to renew permits.[217] It seems only reasonable to require periodic testing in all areas initially tested, for example, as a condition of permit renewal. People lose skills and forget information over time. Furthermore, laws change periodically. The state should inform all permit holders of any material changes in relevant laws. Retesting upon renewal would ensure that permit holders remain well-versed in the law, and proficient and safe in the use of their handguns.

C. Restrictions on Carrying in Certain Places[218] [Page 1550]

Some buildings, apparently unlike the rest of society, can be kept completely free of most weapons, including firearms, through the use of metal detectors and other devices. It is therefore much less likely that armed criminal aggression will occur within them, obviating much of the need to carry handguns for protection. Consequently, many carry reform states specifically restrict the right of permit holders to carry handguns in schools, government buildings, courthouses, jails, and meeting halls. The reforms should include a specific statutory provision to this effect.[219] It is cautioned, however, that the enumerated exceptions should not swallow the rule of liberal carry. To the extent that permit holders are required constantly to disarm as they enter various buildings, the policy of empowerment which the reforms embrace is frustrated, and the social utility which they offer is reduced.

This list could easily be incorporated into the initial and renewal examinations to put permit holders on actual notice and eliminate most subsequent misunderstandings. The law should clearly specify the way in which permit holders are to comply with the mandate to disarm in listed buildings. For example, they could be permitted to check their handguns with the sheriffs in courthouse lobbies without fear of prosecution for carrying to that point. Alternatively, the law could provide that permit holders may temporarily lock their handguns in their vehicles while they enter listed buildings unarmed in order to conform with the law. [Page 1551]

D. Prohibition on "Carrying Under the Influence"[220]

In order to deter irresponsible behavior and/or impaired judgment, the law could be written in a manner similar to that employed in the context of automobiles.[221] The permit to carry, much like the license to drive an automobile, could be regarded as implicit consent to testing for blood alcohol levels. Penalties could be imposed for carrying a handgun (with a permit or without) under the influence of alcohol or drugs ("C.U.I."), including, but not limited to, immediate revocation of the carry permit. Furthermore, the law could restrict concealed carry in bars and other places of nuisance.[222]

E. Statewide Preemption

One of the common goals of carry reform is to ensure state wide uniformity of requirements and to reduce the possibility that localities will unilaterally restrict the issuance of permits. This problem threatens to be particularly acute in urban centers, where residents are generally in greater need of self-protection.[223] State preemption of local ordinances affecting concealed carry permits is employed by many states in an effort to prevent localities from diminishing the effectiveness of state reforms.[224] [Page 1552]

F. Local Authority Input

New Jersey currently suffers from an outright excess of local authority over the application process.[225] The total elimination of local discretion in approving applications, however, has its drawbacks. Chief among them is the consequent inability to screen out unstable or "trouble-prone" individuals who would pose a danger to themselves and to the public were they to be armed. As noted supra, the prohibition on concealed carry by the unlicensed might do little, if anything, to deter these individuals from carrying without permits. The same rationale, however, which supports background checks for criminal convictions and psychological problems serves to justify some local input to reduce the possibility that as-yet-unconvicted troublemakers will be issued permits.[226] [Page 1553]

Local police agencies could be permitted to submit a report in which they notify the state's issuing agency that an applicant might be a danger to himself or to the public. This input, however, should fall short of empowering the local agencies to veto any application. Evaluation of the local report for the purpose of denying a permit could be based on a showing of good cause, and the burden of establishing it should be placed on the state to prevent abuses of the provision. There is a danger that restrictive localities might use this provision to impose a de facto prohibition on the issuance of permits to the economically powerless, particularly in urban centers. In an effort to reduce this risk, the reasonable costs involved in challenging denials under the section could be awarded to all prevailing applicants as a matter of course.[227]

G. Four or Five Year Permit Life with the Current Low Application Fee[228]

The permit could expire every four or five years, requiring renewal at that point. Extending the life of the permit might be appropriate in an effort to reduce paperwork and liberate tight resources. New Jersey's relatively low fee should be retained so as not to exclude those with low incomes, who may need the permit more than any other group. [Page 1554]

H. Statutory Time Within Which the State Must Either Approve or Deny, with Cause, All Applications[229]

In an effort to reduce the likelihood that less-than-enthusiastic bureaucrats and/or antagonistic administrations might "drag their heels" in reviewing applications, a reasonable time limit should be placed on the issuing authority within which to evaluate each application and either grant or deny it. Where the permit application is denied, the specific reasons therefore should be set forth and provided to the applicant in writing. Obviously, denials should be restricted to applicants who fail to satisfy the specific statutory criteria.

I. Requirement that All Permit Holders Carry Their Permits When Carrying Their Handguns[230]

Finally, the police may occasionally notice that a permit holder is carrying a handgun, for example, where the silhouette of the gun is evident on the frame of a permit holder. To expedite the resolution of any question by the police as to whether the individual is carrying legally, all permit holders should be required to carry their permits whenever they carry their handguns. Additionally, the police will have to be clear that some civilians who carry handguns do so lawfully. Therefore, the civilian training program should be developed in conjunction with changes in police training in order to maintain harmonious relations between the two groups. Applicants should be trained to behave in a certain way when they interact with police officers, for example, to immediately identify [Page 1555] themselves as permit holders and show their permits.[231] The police must be trained to recognize this behavior and to respond appropriately.

VIII. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR CHANGE

New Jersey's highly restrictive concealed carry law is a dinosaur. The subjective "justifiable need" standard is motivated by an empirically invalid distrust of some of the state's most trustworthy citizens. The state has absolved its police of any duty to protect individual residents from violent crime, while effectively prohibiting those civilians from exercising responsibility for their own safety. Empirical evidence indicates that the use of handguns to resist crimes is more effective and safer than the alternatives of either submitting, or resisting with other weapons, and that self-defense with handguns is already relatively common.[232] It is quite possible that widespread carry permits, accompanied by heightened publicity of the program, could have a deterrent effect on violent crime. Finally, carry reform poses no threat to public safety.

Still, New Jersey clings desperately to its regressive policy to the detriment of its citizens and their safety. It is time for New Jersey to show once again that it is worthy of its progressive reputation. It must ensure public safety, not by putting its residents at risk of criminal attack with no means of self defense, but by screening, educating and empowering those willing to resist unlawful aggression. Naturally, not all confrontations will lend themselves to resistance. What is proposed, however, is neither that everyone be armed, nor that everyone fight back in every instance. Rather, every statutorily qualified adult should have a choice whether to be trained, armed and able to decide rationally at the time whether and to what extent resistance is advisable.

It is theoretically possible to argue that the court should reverse its previous readings of the justifiable need standard, but this is probably unrealistic. Furthermore, merely relaxing the need requirement would not remove the existing unfettered [Page 1556] discretion of local authorities. Finally, it would not begin to address the desperate need to revise the training requirements. Litigation is, therefore, no real solution. Conversely, a response by the state legislature would be much more appropriate.[233] Statutory carry reform would remove from the courts and the local authorities the ability to interpret and implement the statute so as to foreclose the possibility of permits. Likewise, it would ensure statewide uniformity. The statutory amendments could remove any requirement of need while imposing heightened objective criteria, including training, which would adequately ensure public safety and responsibility among permit holders.

Laws which restrict the carrying of concealed handguns by screened, trained civilians do not further public safety. Rather, they merely enable the lawless to victimize the lawful while secure in the knowledge that they do so with relative impunity. When a violent crime is commenced, there is sometimes a viable alternative available to an armed victim other than simply begging the criminal to spare his or her life. Those for whom that choice is preferable should be empowered to resist crimes, where appropriate, safely and legally. New Jersey should join the rapidly growing majority of states to admit that they cannot protect their residents from criminals and that intended victims are generally in the best position to resist and stop crimes before they are completed. Individuals are expected to provide for their own safety. Qualified civilians deserve the means by which to do so.

* B.A., 1992, Rutgers College; J.D., 1995, Rutgers University School of Law¾Newark. The author wishes to thank Professor Philip Shuchman for his guidance, encouragement and persistence.

1. Gary Kleck, Crime Control Through the Private Use of Armed Force, 35 SOC. PROBS. 1, 17 (1988).

2. Note that a comparison between New Jersey's violent crime and murder/non-negligent manslaughter [hereinafter "murder"] rates and the corresponding national averages compels the conclusion that New Jersey is not "overrun" with crime. The latest available edition of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports (1993) indicates that New Jersey is well below the average national rates of 746.1 and 9.5 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively, for violent crime and murder. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME, IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 58 (1993) [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS]. New Jersey's corresponding rates were 626.9 and 5.3 per 100,000 inhabitants for the same period. Id. at 60. Certainly, the argument could be made that any violent crime is entirely too much.

3. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMAINAL VICITMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 67 (1992) [hereinafter VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS].

4. Because the reforms are enjoying such success, it is quite likely that the following list will be out of date by the time this work goes to print. At last count there were twenty-seven states providing for more liberal issuance of concealed carry permits, without requiring that applicants show a subjective "need" to carry handguns: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75 (1994) (since 1936) (requiring that applicants have a "proper reason" for carrying a handgun); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.65.700 and .705 (1994) (enacted 1994); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2112 (Supp. 1994) (enacted 1994); Arkansas, Act of Feb. 23, 1995, 1995 Ark. Acts; Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-28 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994) n (since 1923) (requiring that all applicants "intend[] to make no use of any pistol or revolver which [they] may be permitted to carry . . . other than a lawful use" and providing for permits to be valid within the locality issuing them); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129 (Supp. 1994) (enacted 1976); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (Supp. 1994) (enacted 1990); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-2-3 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (enacted 1973) (requiring a "proper reason"); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25 § 2003 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (enacted 1981); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101 (1993) (enacted 1991); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-321 (1993) (enacted 1991); Nevada, Act effective Oct. 1, 1995, ch. 713, 1995 Nev. Stat. (amending NEV. REV. STAT. § 202); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:6 (1994) (since 1923) (requiring a "proper purpose"); North Carolina, Act of Jul. 10, 1995, ch. 398, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-415.10 to 415.23, 14-269); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03 (1985 & Supp. 1993) (enacted 1985) (requiring a "valid reason . . . including self-protection" and protection of others); Oklahoma, Oklahoma Self-Defense Act, ch. 272, 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws (to be codified at Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1290); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 166.291 (1990) (enacted 1989); Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109 (Supp. 1994) (enacted 1988) (specifically including self-defense as a proper reason to carry a firearm); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23-7-7 to -8.4 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (enacted 1985); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN.§ 39-17-1315(b) (Supp. 1994) (enacted 1994); Texas, Act effective Sep. 1, 1995, ch. 229, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws (to be codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29ee)); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-701 to -709 (1994 & Supp. 1994) (enacted 1986); Virginia, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308 (Michie Supp. 1995) (enacted 1995); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.070 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (since 1961); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 61-7-4 (1992) (enacted 1989); and Wyoming, Act effective Oct. 1, 1994, ch. 41, 1994 Wyo. Sess. Laws (amending WYO. STAT. S 6-8-104).

One additional state, Vermont, has enacted no general, state-level criminal prohibition on concealed carry by its citizens. Consequently, no permit is required. Vermont punishes the carrying of firearms only if the carrier has the intent of injuring others or is on the grounds of state facilities without permission. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (1974). There is no statutory preemption provision to prevent localities from prohibiting concealed carry under threat of criminal penalty.

It should be noted that Pennsylvania's law is subject to one caveat. In cities "of the first class" (population 1,000,000 or greater), 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 101 (1974 & Supp. 1994), applicants must show a need for a permit. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6108-6109 (Supp. 1994). Philadelphia is the only city that currently fits this description; its population was estimated to be 1,552,572 in 1992, based on 1990 census data. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 466 (1994). Pennsylvania's second largest city, Pittsburgh, had a population of roughly 370,000 in 1990. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 44 (1993) (hereinafter Statistical Abstract). Pittsburgh's population is declining and is estimated to have been 367,000 in 1992. 1994 Statistical Abstract 45. The need requirement applies only to applications received in Philadelphia; those with residences outside of the city may acquire permits elsewhere without showing a need. Permits issued outside of Philadelphia are valid in the city. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6108-6109 (Supp. 1994).

5. Nearly all of the liberal concealed carry states require some sort of permit to carry a concealed handgun. Only Vermont requires no permit. See supra note .

6. See supra note 4.

7. In other words, the issuing authority must grant a permit upon reception of a proper application (which might include proof of successful completion of the requisite training course), and the required background check comes back negative for both criminal record and psychological problems. There is no discretion on the part of the authority to deny the permit at that point. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).

8. For example, some state laws provide that the issuing authority "may" issue carry permits to applicants who satisfy certain criteria. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-28 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994).

9. The term "objective" as used herein denotes criteria that, by their nature, do not lend themselves to interpretation according to widely divergent standards, and that apply to fact patterns with predictable clarity. For example, requirements that applicants be at least twenty-one years old, and not have been convicted of a first, second or third degree crime under New Jersey law, or their equivalents in another jurisdiction, leave very little room for interpretation.

On the other hand, the term "subjective," for purposes of this Article, denotes criteria that lend themselves to various interpretations, and that necessarily apply differently to changing fact patterns with different results. For example, requirements that applicants be of "good character" and demonstrate a "justifiable need to carry a handgun" invite the decision maker to evaluate, for his or her own purposes, what constitutes such character and need. Obviously, reasonable minds differ on the accurate meanings to be attributed to these criteria and the outcome of their application to particular scenarios.

10. See supra note 4.

11. See supra note 4.

12. Alaska, Arizona, Tennessee and Wyoming adopted non-need-based, non-discretionary concealed carry permit systems in 1994. See supra note 4.

13. Arkansas, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia enacted reforms in the first seven months of 1995. See supra note 4.

14. Roger Worthington, Support Mounting for Concealed Guns; Illinois, Wisconsin Among States that May Loosen Weapons Limits, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 1995, at 1 (correctly predicting that half the states will have embraced carry reform by the end of 1995).

15. Given the rather intense admonitions of those opposing carry reform and the intensity with which the activities of permit holders are commonly monitored, it is certainly reasonable to suppose that the newly enacted laws would be hastily repealed in the event that the adverse predictions came true. Likewise, it seems equally reasonable, as a general proposition, to surmise that the failure of any state to repeal its reforms speaks to the inaccuracy of the doomsday hypotheses.

16. The issue has recently attracted the attention of the local press. The debate over the reforms in Texas resulted in a front-page story in the New York Times. See Sam H. Verhovek, States Seek to Let Citizens Carry Concealed Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1995, at A1, B8. The article described the wave of reforms across the country as a "powerful movement," and attributed it, in part, to the new Republican control of many state governments. Id. at A1. Note that states were liberalizing their carry laws long before the 1994 elections. See supra note 4. A map of the United States that was provided in the article demonstrated that New Jersey was one of only twelve restrictive carry states not considering reform at that time. Verhovek, supra, at B8.

The Texas debate was also reported in The Wall Street Journal. See Dave Shiflett, Have Gun, Will Eat Out, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1995, at A20. The article documented that this movement does not lack powerful anecdotal support. Much of the fuel for the reforms in Texas derives from the tragic slaughter of twenty-three people in a diner in Killeen, Texas, in October, 1991. A chiropractor named Suzanna Gratia was in the diner with her parents, who had just celebrated their forty-seventh wedding anniversary. Ms. Gratia had previously carried an unlicensed revolver in her purse for self-defense, but left it in her car that day, deterred by the state's restrictive carry law. As she sat with her parents, a "pistol-bearing psychopath," apparently undeterred, entered and began killing customers. Unarmed, Ms. Gratia was unable to stop the gunman from fatally shooting her father in the chest. Although Ms. Gratia escaped, her mother was executed as she cradled her dying husband on the floor. Ms. Gratia recalled the murder of her defenseless mother: "When the gunman came over, Mother looked up at him and he put the gun to her head. She bowed her head down and he shot her." Id.

The Journal article contrasted the Texas tragedy with an incident, two months later, in Anniston, Alabama. The scenario was similar, except that carry permits have been issued since 1936 without a showing of need in Alabama. See supra note 4. Two armed criminals entered a restaurant and began herding twenty customers into a walk-in refrigerator. Among the customers was a legally armed civilian, Glenn Terry. Mr. Terry responded quickly by drawing his .45 caliber pistol, killing one of the perpetrators with five shots to the chest, and reducing the other to "non-threatening status." Mr. Terry sustained only minor injuries. Shiflett, supra, at A20.

17. A civilian in New Jersey may keep and carry firearms without a permit, but only "about his place of business, residence, premises or other land owned or possessed by him." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-6e (West 1982 & Supp. 1994). Those who are concerned for their safety in public and are non-felons over the age of 18 may legally resort only to the following means of self-defense:

one pocket-sized device which contains and releases not more than three-quarters of an ounce of chemical substance not ordinarily capable of lethal use or of inflicting serious bodily injury, but rather, is intended to produce temporary physical discomfort or disability through being vaporized or otherwise dispensed in the air.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-6i (West 1982 & Supp. 1994). In a world in which violent criminals are frequently armed with various deadly weapons, a public policy limiting the amount of force that may be exerted by an innocent victim in response to life-threatening aggression is puzzling. It is a curious law indeed which posits a society in which only criminals possess the means to kill.

Where a violent criminal possesses a firearm, any attempt by his victim to defend himself or herself by inducing "temporary discomfort" in the criminal would likely result in serious injury to the victim or others, no matter what the extent of the defensive opportunity. One is not generally prevented from pulling the trigger of a gun because one is temporarily uncomfortable. This is especially so if the criminal is intent on hurting people. In such a situation, the only viable response by the victim entails the use of deadly force. See infra discussion of the relative effectiveness of using handguns in self-defense, Section V.A. It is perfectly rational for a victim who realizes that a criminal is going to attempt to kill him or her to resist that attempt with any amount of force available. It is, however, often safer, more effective, and perfectly legal to use deadly force instead. See infra Section V.A.; see also infra note 27.

18. JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 225 (1986). The authors of this book note that "few issues evoke such passion or have had a longer run on the political playbill than what to do about crime and the guns with which crimes are committed." Id. For example, one gun control proponent complained of carry reform: "They are going to make guns as readily available as popcorn in a candy store." Worthington, supra note 14, at 1.

19. Richard Getchell, Carrying Concealed Weapons in Self-Defense: Florida Adopts Uniform Regulations for the Issuance of Concealed Weapons Permits, 15 FLA. ST. L. REV. 751, 752 (1987) (reviewing positions regarding the liberalization of gun laws).

20. Id.

21. DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 422-32 (1992).

22. It is possible that the prospect of an increased number of armed minorities as a result of carry reform contributes to this feeling of uneasiness in some white members of the population. See Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y17 (1995). Cramer argues that gun control laws in general are often motivated by racist feelings and a desire to keep minorities "in their place." Id. at 17. The author concludes by analogizing gun control schemes to suspect classifications, such as racial or ethnic distinctions, and laws abridging fundamental rights. Id. at 23. "(G)un control historically has been a tool of racism and associated with racist attitudes about black violence. Similarly, many gun control laws impinge on that most fundamental of rights: self-defense." Id. Therefore, Cramer argues, gun control laws should also be subject to strict scrutiny by the courts. Id.

My concern is that past motivations for disarming blacks are really not so different from the motivations behind disarming law-abiding citizens today. In the last century, the rhetoric in support of such laws was that "they" (i.e., blacks) were too violent and too untrustworthy to be allowed weapons. Today, the same elitist rhetoric regards law-abiding Americans the same way, as children in need of guidance from the government.

Id. at 22.

23. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994) (providing the limits on the justifiable use of deadly force); see also infra note 27. Were a permit holder to "execute" a criminal without recourse to a viable justification defense, that individual would likely be charged with and convicted of murder, a crime that carries with it the most ominous penalties our society administers, possibly including the death penalty. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).

24. See, e.g., George D. Newton, Jr. & Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Violence in American Life, STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 67-68 (1969); Mark Fleischer, Note, The Interpretive Process and People v. Marotta: A Search for Safety in the Shadow Between Concept and Reality, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1053-56 (1985).

25. Even if this premise is accepted for the moment (i.e., most crimes will not offer the victims a chance to resist with the handgun), it simply cannot be denied that some victims would have the opportunity to resist effectively if they were allowed to carry handguns. If some victims would be able to defend themselves and the reforms pose no danger to public safety (as is apparently the case), then it would of course be rational to allow qualified civilians that opportunity.

Note that a lack of training is often associated with the "limited utility" argument. See Fleischer, supra note 24, at 1054. Fleischer also notes that "the value of the handgun in opposing crime has often been questioned, especially when the crime is armed robbery and the victim is an untrained civilian." Id. (emphasis added). Fleischer continues, adding that a lack of training in the law of justification may result in the "potentially catastrophic legal consequences" of a wrongful shooting. Id. at 1055. This Article concurs in Fleischer's admonition and, accordingly, advocates a dramatic increase in the amount and quality of training required of all permit holders, including both proficient use of the handgun and thorough understanding of the law of justification. For the "suggested reform provisions" proposed, see infra Section VII.

26. Parenthetically, it is often maintained that to resist criminal violence by force is "uncivilized" and reminiscent of the "wild west." One author has argued that:

[T]he notion that defending oneself with lethal force is not "civilized" arises from the view that violence is always wrong, or the view that each human being is of such intrinsic worth that it is wrong to kill anyone under any circumstances. The necessary implication of these propositions, however, is that life is not worth defending. Far from being "civilized," the beliefs that counterviolence and killing are always wrong are an invitation to the spread of barbarism.

Jeffrey R. Snyder, A Nation of Cowards, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1993, at 40, 52. Snyder further argues, inter alia, that it is hypocritical, if not cowardly, to demand police protection while categorically refusing to assume any responsibility for defending oneself. "If you believe it reprehensible to possess the means and will to use lethal force to repel a criminal assault, how can you call upon another to do so for you?" Id. at 43-44.

27. New Jersey's law of justification is codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:3-1 to -11 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994). Justification in the use of any amount of force is an affirmative defense. Id. § 2C:3-1a (West 1982). "Deadly force" is defined at § 11b (West 1982 & Supp. 1994):

"Deadly force" means force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Purposely firing a firearm in the direction of another person or at a vehicle, building or structure in which another person is believed to be constitutes deadly force. A threat to cause death or serious bodily harm, by the production of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor's purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute deadly force.

Id. (emphasis added).

Section 3-4b(2) limits the use of the justification defense where the actor employs deadly force, providing that:

The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm; nor is it justifiable if:

(a) The actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter; or

(b) The actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take, except that:

(i) The actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his dwelling by another person whose dwelling the actor knows it to be; and

(ii) A public officer justified in using force in the performance of his duties or a person justified in using force in his assistance or a person justified in using force in making an arrest or preventing an escape is not obliged to desist from efforts to perform such duty, effect such arrest or prevent such escape because of resistance or threatened resistance by or on behalf of the person against whom such action is directed.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4b(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1994). Under some circumstances, the use of deadly force in defense of others may be justifiable. Id. § 2C:3-5 (West 1982).

28. See infra Section V.

29. See infra Section V.A.

30. In providing examples of cases to support his proposition, one author has observed that:

Gun ownership and the option to resist crime which it confers carries with it risks and opportunities. These may be illustrated by considering some alternative circumstances involving a woman menaced by a rapist in her home. If she becomes aware of the rapist as he breaks in, the gun allows her to frighten him off or capture and hold him for police. But if her first knowledge is being awakened by the pressure of a weapon against her throat, nothing compels her to reach for a gun. Properly secreted it remains available for use if, for instance, the rapist becomes distracted in disrobing or by a police or fire siren or some other external event or it becomes clear that he intends to mutilate or kill her regardless, so that it is rational to resist no matter how slim her chances of success. In short, a gun simply offers victims an option; a dangerous option to be used only with discretion and/or because throwing oneself on the mercy of a violent attacker may be more dangerous. Fortunately those people who have the foresight to equip themselves with guns as a means of resistance seem also to have the good judgment not to try to use those weapons when that would only serve to endanger them further.

Donald B. Kates, Jr., The Value of Civilian Handgun Possession as a Deterrent to Crime or a Defense Against Crime, 18 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 113, 150-51 (1991) (citations omitted).

31. See infra Section V.B.

32. See infra notes 155 and 156.

33. See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.

34. See infra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.

35. For a contrary view, see Snyder, supra note 26, at 54 (concluding that a federal initiative is required).

36. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4 (West 1982).

37. Id. § 2C:58-4c. The two other requirements are that the applicant: (1) not be subject to any of the statutory disabilities which would prohibit the applicant from purchasing a firearm; and (2) be thoroughly familiar with the safe handling and use of handguns. Permit holders are not required to understand the principles of justification. Id.

38. Siccardi v. State, 284 A.2d 533, 538 (N.J. 1971). It should be noted that the court was interpreting former, and substantially similar, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:151-41 to -46 (repealed 1979), of which the present provisions are direct descendants. The former statute required that applicants demonstrate a "need" for a permit, as opposed to a "justifiable need" as provided by the current statute. Id. §§ 2A:151-44, 2C:58-4. Arguably, in selecting such nebulous standards, the legislature invited the Court to restrict the issuance of carry permits by interpreting the need requirement. See Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 540. The question posed within this section is simply this: Did the court go too far?

39. Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 540.

40. Id.; see also In re X, 284 A.2d 530, 531 (N.J. 1971); Reilly v. State, 284 A.2d 541, 541-43 (N.J. 1971).

41. 284 A.2d at 533.

42. Id. at 535.

43. The court actually twice noted that the applicant had not yet been attacked. Id. at 535, 540. Also, the court indicated that, to substantiate an "urgent necessity" to carry a weapon for self-protection, one might proffer evidence that he or she had been seriously threatened or attacked already. Id. at 540. This "urgent necessity" standard does not appear in either the current or the former statute. Neither does any suggestion that an applicant must show that he or she has already been victimized. It is unclear from the court's opinion how many times an applicant must be attacked for the court to be satisfied that the applicant has shown a need to carry a handgun. Indeed, such a "prior victimization" requirement would seem to defeat the purpose of providing for permits. Victims of violent crime victims do not always survive their first attack.

44. Id. at 540.

45. Id. at 536-37.

46. One could reasonably wonder why we allow police and security guards to carry weapons if they are utterly useless in the prevention of crimes and self-defense. Of course, handguns are often useful in these roles. They may be similarly useful, sometimes, when used by other citizens. Certainly the court could not seriously maintain that either police, or security guards in particular, are inherently superior to other citizens. Absent this superiority, the question remains what distinguishes them from the general population. It may be that police, and to a lesser extent security guards, are screened and trained. If these are the material differences, carry reform almost uniformly provides both safeguards. It is significant that permit holders need not receive nearly the amount of training provided to the state's law enforcement professionals, whose duties include many services far beyond the scope of simple self-defense. Therefore, for the purpose of evaluating the competence of civilians to carry handguns for lawful purposes, the appropriate question is: Can private individuals be trained to lawfully defend themselves? Quite simply, there are too many responsible, intelligent civilians in New Jersey to answer this question in the negative.

47. Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 535. The court's logic is perplexing. As discussed more fully infra, the police have no duty to do that which the court suggests for anyone, absent some sort of special relationship. Additionally, not only are the services of security guards expensive, but the training given to such guards is legendary in its inadequacy. One study found that most security training consisted of advice to use "common sense" not to "smell of alcohol" and not fall asleep. Dennis H. Walters, Training: The Key to Avoiding Liability, in CURRENT ISSUES IN SECURITY MANAGEMENT 249 (Shari M. Gallery ed., 1988).

Furthermore, the court's "alternative" to concealed carry is simply illusory to New Jersey's urban poor, who commonly inhabit some of the highest crime areas in the state. See infra note 223. They are in dire need of personal protection and the means to defend themselves¾arguably more so than their suburban counterparts. They lack, however, the financial ability to hire security guards to accompany them in their daily lives. Additionally, even if the local police were inclined to escort them through their neighborhoods absent any duty to do so, the reality of their limited resources would probably prohibit such gratuitous action.

48. Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 536-37. The police authorities, as stated by the court, employed standards which included: "crucial need," "substantiated threats to life or personal security," and "absolute[] [necessity] under the circumstances." Id. None of these burdensome standards are required, authorized, or in any way suggested by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4c, or its predecessor, § 2A:151-44. The current statute requires applicants to show only a "justifiable need." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4c (West 1992).

The court relied largely on the anecdotal experiences of local police authorities to establish for its purposes the ineffectiveness of carrying handguns to stop crimes. Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 536-37. The court quoted police administrators as generally claiming that they had heard of very few, if any, instances in which a permit holder had foiled an attempted robbery. Id. This evidence has very little value considering that the same police representatives also admitted that they had rarely, if ever, approved permit applications. Id. Given that legal concealed carry was so rare, it is not surprising that the number of successful self-defense encounters was so minimal. Therefore, the police representatives who testified categorically begged the question of the effectiveness of handgun possession in the prevention of crime. Yet, the court placed great weight on their opinions.

The common tendency of police officials to underestimate the value of self-defense with handguns has been termed "The Police Chief's Fallacy." GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 126-27 (1991). It is quite likely that their opinions are heavily biased because of the nature of their contact with victims who have resisted with handguns. The frequency of successful handgun resistance that they actually encounter is "substantially underrepresentative" of the experiences of crime victims in the general population. Id. at 127. Several factors may account for this bias. First, as discussed supra, civilian carry permits are rare. Second, most crimes are never reported to the police, and crimes which involve neither injury nor property loss are the most likely to go unreported. "By definition, all successful defensive gun uses fall within the no-injury, no-property-loss category, and thus are largely invisible to the police. Consequently, police never hear about the bulk of successful gun uses, instead hearing mostly about an underrepresentative minority of them dominated by failures." Id. (emphasis added).

A third possible reason for police bias may be that many successful victims, having suffered neither injury nor property loss, wisely choose not to notify the authorities of the incident because they either owned, possessed or carried the handgun in violation of law. This phenomenon may be especially prevalent in urban areas where the police and the governments are often more hostile to private gun ownership, permits are more difficult to acquire, and the public fear of crime is understandably much more intense.

49. Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 537.

50. NEWTON & ZIMRING, supra note 24, at 67. Indeed, the "study" provided no factual support for the proposition for which it was cited. Id. Rather, the commentary by Newton and Zimring, regarding the claimed lack of self-defense handgun utility against street crimes, represented merely a hypothesis, unadorned by even a single piece of data. Id. Additionally, the authors claimed that "the ready accessibility of guns contributes significantly to the number of unpremeditated homicides and to the seriousness of many assaults." Id. They failed to cite any evidence for this alleged phenomenon. Id.

51. See infra Section V.A. (empirical); Shiflett, supra note 16, at A20 (anecdotal). The court's acceptance of the premise that handguns offer low self-defense utility effectively minimized any need which subsequent applicants might be able to demonstrate. In other words, to the extent the court established precedent to the effect that handguns are not useful for self-defense as a matter of law, however factually incorrect this assertion may be, the court also established that, no matter how dire any applicant's need for self-defense in the abstract, there is no need to do so with a handgun. It is therefore not surprising that, in affirming denial of the permit based on the need requirement, the court embarked on this discussion; nor is it surprising that civilian carry permits for day-to-day life in New Jersey are now so rare as to be unheard of. No matter what the facts of an applicant's case, no permit will be issued if it is assumed that a handgun will be of no use to the applicant. For example, if a woman were to apply for a carry permit because her physically abusive ex-husband was stalking her, threatening her, and causing her to reasonably fear for her life, her application would very likely be denied because of the alleged uselessness of her carrying a handgun to defend herself. One wonders if the legislature intended that carry permits be restricted to this extent.

52. See Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 537 (noting that England does not consider self-defense a "good reason" to own a firearm).

53. Id. at 540. Apparently the court also felt that the applicant was incompetent to assess these risks for himself. By all indications, the applicant was a fully functioning adult.

54. Id.

55. Id.

56. Roughly one percent of the population may be expected to express an interest sufficient to go through the permit application procedures. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text. In light of the relative infrequency with which permits are issued, relaxing the need requirement would have been a fairly modest proposal.

57. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.

58. Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 540.

59. Id.

60. Id.

61. In re X, 284 A.2d at 531; Reilly, 284 A.2d at 541.

62. 284 A.2d at 531.

63. Id.

64. 284 A.2d at 541-42.

65. Id. at 542-43.

66. Id. at 541-42.

67. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 632 A.2d 539, 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (holding that a mayor could not satisfy the need requirement because his duties as head of the police department were only supervisory); Doe v. Township of Dover, 524 A.2d 469, 471 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (refusing to find need, even on a limited basis, where applicant regularly carried large sums of money and jewelry from one business to another); In re Rawls, 484 A.2d 53, 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (holding that a special policeman was required to obtain a permit to carry while working as an armed security guard for a private company); State v. Sima, 361 A.2d 58, 61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (holding that a permit restricted to applicant's time on the job as a bank guard was appropriate), aff'd, 379 A.2d 1275 (N.J. 1977).

68. See supra note 51.

69. 573 A.2d 148 (N.J. 1990).

70. Id. at 149-50.

71. Id. at 150.

72. Id. at 152.

73. Id. at 152 (citing Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 533). Recall that no permit is required to carry a handgun "about (one's) place of business, residence, premises or other land owned or possessed by (that person)." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-6e (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); see supra note 17. Therefore, concealed carry permits are generally sought for defense against street crimes, and the court most likely meant that some robberies involve "merely" the taking of property. Section 2C:15-1 of the New Jersey Code, in pertinent part, defines robbery as:

a. A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he:

(1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; or

(2) Threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury; or

(3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree.

N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2C:15-1 (West 1992).

The court's statement that the protection of "property alone" will not suffice to show need under the statute is difficult to accept. The statutory definition of robbery states unequivocally that the crime cannot involve only property; rather, by definition, robbery requires a threat to one's person, usually one's life. Much like kidnapping, robbery is only tangentially related to property. By contrast, burglary and theft may be considered "property crimes." To the extent the court's test is designed to limit permits for those concerned with robberies (by assuming that some robberies are only about property), that test is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the crime.

Furthermore, the court apparently assumed that a robbery may involve only the taking of one's material possessions, and that the victim may simply hand them over to the criminal, thereby avoiding any threat to his or her person. This is simply not the case. Once the robber gets what he has demanded, it is still his choice whether to allow the victim (who, in many cases, can identify him) to remain unharmed. The criminal may decide to hurt or kill the victim despite the fact that he or she had fully cooperated.

The court apparently endorsed the position that society should encourage its violent crime victims to give criminals anything they demand in an effort to avoid injury. As discussed infra, the assertion that it is safer for victims to capitulate than to resist with handguns is statistically untenable. Additionally, this position is not without its detractors on purely philosophical grounds. As discussed above, it has been called a manifestation of cowardice that encourages lawlessness. See Snyder, supra note 26, at 52. In other words, it may be less than the visionary pursuit of a peaceful and orderly utopia to force an entire population to uniformly and immediately reward criminals for their unlawful and unacceptable behavior.

74. In re Preis, 573 A.2d at 155.

75. Both of these additional permit requirements would remain if the court relaxed the need requirement. N.J. STAT. ANN. SS 2C:58-4c and 2C:58-3c (West Supp. 1994).

76. Kopel, supra note 21, at 394 n.9, 395 n.15 (providing examples of the ineffectiveness of the 911 system in cities such as Los Angeles, California and Buffalo, New York, due to severe understaffing).

77. VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS, supra note 3, at 118.

78. Police response times are sometimes mocked: "Call for a cop, call for an ambulance, and call for a pizza. See who shows up first." Snyder, supra note 26, at 43.

79. The police immunity rule is not unique to New Jersey. It is firmly grounded in common law and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. KOPEL, supra note 21, at 375. For a survey of cases, see id. at 394 n.10. See also Kates, supra note 30, at 123-25.

80. The cases in which plaintiffs claim they were victimized due to the failure of the police to respond can yield particularly vicious fact patterns. As the cases often illustrate, the extent of this immunity is not vitiated by emotionally moving facts. For example, in Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968), the court held that the government would not be liable even for grossly negligent failures to protect crime victims.

In the Riss case, a young woman telephoned the police and begged for help because her ex-boyfriend had repeatedly threatened "If I can't have you, no one else will have you, and when I get through with you, no one else will want you." The day after she had pleaded for police protection, the ex-boyfriend threw lye in her face, blinding her in one eye, severely damaging the other, and permanently scarring her features. "What makes the City's position particularly difficult to understand," wrote a dissenting opinion, "is that, in conformity to the dictates of the law, Linda did not carry any weapon for self-defense. Thus, by a rather bitter irony she was required to rely for protection on the City of New York which now denies all responsibility to her." KOPEL, supra note 21, at 394 n.10 (quoting Riss, 240 N.E.2d at 861).

81. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 12-3 (West 1992).

82. Id. §§ 59:5-4 to -5 (West 1992).

83. See, e.g., Lee v. Doe, 557 A.2d 1045, 1052 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that police officers were immune from suit for their failure to take action in response to plaintiff's earlier complaint that the assailant had threatened him); Suarez v. Dosky, 407 A.2d 1237, 1241 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (noting that police officers are not liable for their failure to respond if they are performing other official duties), cert. denied, 412 A.2d 806 (N.J. 1980); Wuethrich v. Delia, 382 A.2d 929, 930 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (holding that the Tort Claims Act barred an action against a township for the death of a person who was shot after police ignored warnings that an armed assailant was in the vicinity), cert. denied, 391 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1978).

84. Lieberman v. Port Authority, 603 A.2d 983, 987 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 622 A.2d 1295 (N.J. 1993).

85. Suarez, 407 A.2d at 1241.

86. Snyder, supra note 26, at 43.

87. The executive director of the National Association of Chiefs of Police, Gerald Arenberg, was quoted as saying, "(y)ou are more likely to find a policeman when you run a red light than when you need him in a violent situation." KOPEL, supra note 21, at 376.

88. Specifically, 88% of violent crimes occur outside of the home. VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS, supra note 3, at 67.

89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5b (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).

90. Id. § 2C:43-6c (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).

91. Id. § 2C:39-5b.

92. Id. § 2C:43-1b.

93. Id. § 2C:43-2a.

94. Id. § 2C:43-6a(3).

95. Id. § 2C:43-3b.

96. Id. § 2C:43-12.

97. Id. § 2C:43-13.

98. Id. § 2C:44-1e. Note, however, that the presumption of non-imprisonment does not preclude the imposition of a custodial term as a condition of probation. See, e.g., State v. Hartye, 522 A.2d 418, 422 (N.J. 1987).

99. See Kates, supra note 30, at 129.

100. See id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. SS 2C:3-1 to -11 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).

101. Id. § 2C:39-4 (Supp. 1994). See State v. Harmon, 516 A.2d 1047, 1052-56 (N.J. 1986); State v. Martinez, 552 A.2d 232, 239-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).

102. See KLECK, supra note 48, at 413-14, in which the author performs a similar analysis to identify the "affected" group with reference to Florida's reforms.

103. The "four group" analysis is subject to the caveat that the same analysis could be adequately performed with only three groups. See infra note 109.

104. As discussed infra, the notion that handguns are ineffective or unsafe for use in repelling criminal attacks is empirically invalid. See infra notes 113-20.

105. See FORIDA DEP'T OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, CONCEALED WEAPONS/FIREARMS LICENSE STATISTICAL REPORT FOR PERIOD 10/1/87 to 02/28/95 (1995) [hereinafter FLORIDA REPORT]; see also infra text accompanying notes 191-94.

106. Recall the enhanced penalties under the Graves Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6c, and for the possession of a firearm "with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another," id. § 2C:39-4, discussed above.

107. It has been argued that criminal prohibitions on the carrying of weapons for otherwise lawful purposes, such as self-defense, breed contempt and disrespect for the law. Snyder, supra note 26, at 54.

108. Note that the nature of concealed carry may mean that the prohibition against illegally doing so is effectively unenforceable at any rate.

109. Note that, for the specific purpose of categorizing and evaluating civilian behavior with respect to carrying handguns, the second and third groups described herein are actually subjects of the same group: those who currently carry handguns in violation of the law. Therefore, it may correctly be said that there are only three groups which need to be analyzed. This larger group is discussed as two separate subgroups in an effort to take account of a wider range of behavior patterns.

110. For a discussion of New Jersey's pretrial intervention program, see supra text accompanying notes 96-97.

111. For a discussion of the presumption of non-custodial sentences for first time offenders, see supra note 98 and accompanying text.

112. Contra Getchell, supra note 19, at 752 (recognizing that Florida's reform was intended solely to empower civilians to defend against violent crime, not as a deterrent to crime).

113. Kates, supra note 30, at 143.

114. Id. at 148.

115. Id. at 148-49.

116. Id. at 149.

117. KLECK, supra note 1, at 9.

118. KLECK, supra note 48, at 122. Kleck notes that 1% represents the upper limit of the figure because it may include instances in which homeowners confront burglars as they are leaving, already having stolen a gun from the home. Therefore, it is likely that less than 1% of resistances with guns actually involve an offender physically snatching the gun out of the victim's hands.

119. KLECK, supra note 1, at 7.

120. Id. at 7-9. Kleck found specifically that, for assault and robbery, only 12% and 17%, respectively, of gun resisters were injured. Of those who did not resist at all, 27% of assault victims and 25% of robbery victims were injured anyway.

121. "People do not have .house guns' to kill burglars but to prevent burglaries. The measure of the effectiveness of self defense is not the number of bodies piled up on doorsteps, but in the property that is protected." B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, THE PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1976, at 37, 39.

122. See KLECK, supra note 1, at 5.

123. VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS, supra note 3, at 67.

124. Only Vermont allows the concealed carry of handguns for self-defense without a permit. See supra note 4.

125. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.

126. Kates, supra note 30, at 149 (noting that deciding whether to use the weapon one is carrying, such as a handgun, is of great importance in minimizing injury in a criminal attack). Kates asserts that the number of victims reporting that they used a gun to defend themselves was "dwarfed by the number who tried to flee or scream or resisted forcibly without a gun." Id. (citing Kleck, supra note 1). The numbers suggest that gun owners may be disproportionately more likely to consider the dangers involved in resisting criminals and less likely to resist if the circumstances suggest otherwise.

127. KLECK, supra note 48, at 101.

128. David McDowall et al., The Incidence of Civilian Defensive Firearm Use (1992); KLECK, supra note 48, at 104-08, 467-68; KLECK, supra note 1, at 2-4.

129. As characterized by Kates, supra note 30, at 141. For Kates' purposes, the term "anti-gun" denotes the extreme position generally characterized by a disdain for self-defense and an adherence to the "creed of the inherent depravity of guns." Id. at 116.

130. Kleck notes that the survey he used was sponsored by the National Alliance Against Violence, which is no longer in existence. Kleck, supra note 1, at 2.

131. Id. at 2. Kleck used data obtained primarily from a 1981 Hart poll of 1,228 registered voters, wherein 6% of the adults surveyed replied "yes" when asked: "Within the past five years, have you yourself or another member of your household used a handgun, even if it was not fired, for self-protection or for the protection of property at home, work, or elsewhere, excluding military service or police work?" Id. They were then asked: "Was this to protect against an animal or a person?" Id. Of the total sample of 1,228 registered voters, 2% replied "animal," 3% "person," and 1% "both." Id. Therefore, Kleck reasoned, 4% of the sample reported that a member of their household used a handgun against a human for self-protection or protection of property. Id. The results of the Hart poll were consistent with those of five other national and state surveys. Id.

Kleck, using census data from the same period, then extrapolated the Hart Survey results to arrive at the actual number of incidents involving defensive uses of handguns against human aggressors. Id. at 4. He concluded that private citizens defensively used handguns about 645,000 times per year. Id. at 3-4. Further, Kleck "roughly" estimated that "guns of all types are used for defensive purposes about one million times per year." Id. at 4.

Donald Kates has suggested that this methodology "may artificially exaggerate lawful defense gun uses in one way and minimize them in five others." Kates, supra note 30, at 141 n.92.

132. Kleck, supra note 1, at 4.

133. Id. at 5.

134. Kleck, supra note 48, at 116. Kleck estimates that, of the civilian gun woundings of criminals known to police, approximately 85% are nonfatal. Id.

135. Id. at 104-08, 467-68.

136. Id. at 105.

137. Id. at 467-68.

138. Id. at 105.

139. Id.

140. Id.

141. Id.

142. Id.

143. Id. at 107.

144. Id. at 467.

145. McDowall, supra note 128, at 1.

146. Id.

147. Id. at 3-4.

148. Id. at 1.

149. Id. at 10 (arguing that "the image of a social order maintained by an armed populace is clearly inaccurate"). Recall that most crimes occur outside of the home, supra text accompanying notes 3 and 88, and that the vast majority of potential victims in that context, even in the carry reform states, are not permit holders, see supra text accompanying note 105. In light of these basic facts, it is highly doubtful that any reasonable person would conclude that an armed populace in the United States currently maintains the social order with regard to violent criminals.

150. McDowall, supra note 128, at 1.

151. Id. at 6-9.

152. Id. at 10.

153. See supra notes 3 and 88. In the abstract, state law may justify the defensive use of a handgun by a crime victim. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:3-1 to -11 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994) (New Jersey's justification provisions), discussed supra note 27. This affirmative defense to criminal charges for the use of a firearm, however, may offer little or no protection for the act of carrying the firearm to the scene. See, e.g., State v. Harmon, 516 A.2d 1047, 1056-59 (N.J. 1986). "Only in those rare and momentary circumstances where an individual arms himself spontaneously to meet an immediate danger should the justification afforded by (N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2C:3-4) be considered." Id. at 1057. The practical effect of the law is to protect a citizen's defensive firearm use only if he or she acquires the firearm by disarming a gun wielding aggressor, finding it at the scene of the attack, or through some other rather unlikely scenario.

154. For example, permit holders in Florida comprise roughly 1% of the state's population. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.

155. For purposes of Uniform Crime Reporting, the F.B.I. defines justifiable homicide as "the killing of a felon by a law enforcement officer in the line of duty, or the killing of a felon, during the commission of a felony, by a private citizen." Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 2, at 22. The total number of annual justifiable homicides has risen 28% since 1989. Id. The reported number of annual justifiable homicides by private citizens has risen by 30%. Id.

156. Id. In 1993, private citizens justifiably killed 356 felons which is nearly 80% of the 455 felons justifiably killed by police. Id. Handguns are used in the vast majority of all justifiable homicides by both police and private citizens. Id. Therefore, even by the F.B.I.'s estimates, the recent lawful use of armed force by non-police accounted for roughly 44% of all justifiable killings in the nation.

157. Donald B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 269-70 n.278 (1983).

158. KLECK, supra note 48, at 111-12.

159. Kleck, supra note 1, at 2.

160. Id. at 11 (citing JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERENCE (1975)).

161. Id. at 11-12, 17.

162. Id. at 12.

163. Id. at 11.

164. KLECK, supra note 48, at 132.

165. Kleck, supra note 1, at 12.

166. Id. at 13-15.

167. Id.

168. Id. at 13.

169. Id.

170. Id.

171. Id.

172. Id.

173. Id.

174. Id

175. Id. at 15. Apparently the Kennesaw ordinance was meant as a statement of disapproval for a ban on handgun ownership in Morton Grove, Illinois. Id.

176. Id.

177. Id.

178. Id.

179. WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 18, at xiii.

180. Id. at 23-32.

181. Id. at 145.

182. Id.

183. Id.

184. Id.

185. Id. at 149.

186. Id. at 154.

187. Kates, supra note 30, at 164.

188. A review of the Uniform Crime Reports from 1975 to 1993 reveals that Florida's violent crime rate has been consistently far above the national average every year. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 2, at 58 (national averages). Florida's murder rate during the same period was above the national average until 1991, when it fell below the national rate. Id. at 52 (1975 edition); id. at 40 (1977 edition); id. at 44 (1979 edition); id. at 42 (1981 edition); id. at 48 (1983 edition); id. at 48 (1985 edition); id. at 48 (1987 edition); id. at 54 (1989 edition); id. at 64 (1991 edition); id. at 64 (1993 edition).

189. See, e.g., Kleck, supra note 48.

190. FLA. STAT. ANN. S 790.06(17) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) mandates that the Florida Department of State submit an annual statistical report to various government leaders indicating the number of licenses issued, revoked, suspended and denied. Florida, therefore, presents a fairly rare opportunity for studying the actual effects of carry reform. Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, Concealed Handgun Permits for Licensed, Trained Citizens: A Policy that is Saving Lives, in INDEPENDENCE ISSUE PAPER, June 18, 1993, at 12.

191. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 2, at 64 (citing Bureau of Census provisional estimates for July 1, 1993).

192. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 105, at 1.

193. Id.

194. See Kleck, supra note 48, at 412.

195. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 105, at 1. Note that of the 279,156 applications used to calculate this figure, 86,051 were renewals. Id.

196. Cf. DAVID MCDOWALL ET AL., EASING CONCEALED FIREARM LAWS: EFFECTS ON HOMICIDE IN THREE STATES (1995). The authors compared the frequency of firearm homicides in five "large urban areas" in three states which have enacted carry reform legislation (Florida, Mississippi and Oregon) both before and after the reforms took effect. Id. at 2. The study found that the firearm homicide rates in three of the five areas increased significantly after the laws were liberalized. Id. at 10. The other two cities experienced insignificant changes; one increased and the other decreased. Id. The authors noted two possible conclusions. Id .at 11. The first was that carry reform does not reduce homicide rates, "at least in large urban areas." Id. The authors, however, acknowledged that "all comparisons find that Florida homicides decreased after the state's (carry reforms took effect)." Id. at 4-5. The second conclusion, which they characterized as the weaker of the two, was that carry reform raises levels of firearm murders. Id. at 11.

This study suffers from a number of basic methodological problems which call its conclusions into question. First, as noted supra, the effect of carry reform must be analyzed with reference to those who change their behavior as a result of the law. See supra Section IV. The study, however, failed to distinguish between homicides by permit holders and those by others who carried illegally. MCDOWALL, supra, at 5-9. The authors did not challenge the "figures showing that few legal carriers misuse their guns." Id. at 4. See, e.g., infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. The researchers apparently dismissed this shortcoming by hypothesizing that carry reform might "increase levels of illegal carrying as well," because criminals might choose to carry guns in response to an increased risk of encountering armed victims. McDowall, supra, at 4 n.21. The authors thereby reasoned that all firearm homicides might be attributable to carry reform. The methodology employed, however, made the study incapable of testing this hypothesis because it only measured levels of overall urban firearm homicide without regard to whether the killers were holders of valid carry permits and because it did not purport to measure rates of handgun carrying by criminals. See id. at 5-9.

Second, although the authors claimed that they found "evidence of an increase in firearm murders," id. at 2, their methodology precluded support for this conclusion because the study failed to distinguish between unjustifiable and justifiable homicides, id. at 10 n.43. The researchers apparently misunderstood the difference between homicide and murder, and repeatedly confused the two terms. Id. at 2, 7, 11-12. All murders necessarily involve homicides, but not all homicides constitute crimes, much less murders. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 734 (6th ed. 1990). A homicide is simply the killing of one human being by another; it is a neutral term describing only an act but not the legal or moral characteristics thereof. Id. A homicide may be either justified or unjustified. Id. By contrast, a murder is a homicide committed "with malice aforethought." Id. at 1019. It is, by definition, unlawful and unjustified, and represents only one of many examples of culpable homicides. Id. at 734-35. While murders may undoubtedly be considered malevolent acts, id. at 1019, justifiable homicides may not. Id. at 734-35, 865. Therefore, the inclusion of justifiable homicides in the study exaggerated the negative effects of carry reform to the extent the figures measure any causative effect at all. MCDOWELL, supra, at 5-9 (discussing the methodology employed).

Third, the scope of the study included only five "large urban areas" in only three reform states. Id. at 2. Therefore, the authors simply ignored all rural and suburban areas, and all urban areas which are not located within the three states studied. Many other states have enacted reforms. See supra note 4. The failure to include changes in homicide rates experienced by non-urban localities ignored possible reductions in those rates outside of the chosen urban areas. Florida's state-wide homicide data support this conclusion. MCDOWELL, supra, at 4-5 & n.22. Clearly a straightforward evaluation of the social utility of carry reform should take into account statewide trends.

Fourth, the study combined all homicides in which any type of firearm was involved and did not restrict its analysis to handgun homicides. Id. at 6. Homicides involving long guns are simply not relevant to the effects of concealed handgun carry reform. The inclusion of long gun homicides in the McDowall study confounded its results.

Fifth, the study was not restricted to homicides which were committed where a permit would be necessary to carry a handgun. Id. at 5-9. Those homicides which occurred where the killers had legal access to firearms without permits, for example, in the killers' homes, are irrelevant for carry reform purposes.

A more precise and much preferable concealed carry analysis would compare statewide rates of unjustifiable handgun homicides committed by permit holders outside of their homes before and after carry reform and would replicate this analysis in a representative sample of carry reform states. By contrast, the McDowall study lacked all of these attributes, possibly because such a study would present practical difficulties. Each of these methodological problems, individually, might not be cause for alarm. The cumulative effect of these shortcomings, however, may be to significantly overestimate the negative impact of carry reform.

197. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 105, at 1.

198. Of the total twenty-three "crimes" involving permit holders since enactment of the reforms in 1987, most probably did not involve any act of violence, but rather technical violations of the carry law. For example, Kleck observed that, of three "crimes" by permit holders in Dade County from February through May 6, 1988, none constituted an act of violence with a gun. KLECK, supra note 48, at 412-13. On the contrary, one involved an arrest for drunken driving and the other two involved failures to disarm prior to entering restricted areas. Id.

199. Kleck, supra note 1, at 5.

200. See supra Section V.B. for a discussion of quasi-experimental evidence from cities adopting high profile "gun awareness" programs correlating with reductions in crime rates.

201. CRAMER & KOPEL, supra note 190, at 13.

202. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.

203. Kleck cautions that Florida changed its methodologies of statistical crime compilation in 1988, "making it impossible to analyze statewide crime trends after the gun law's effective date." KLECK, supra note 48, at 412. It should be noted that a single change in methodology might explain a sudden, one-time change in the overall levels of certain crimes following the y