Hamline Law Review
Symposium on Firearms Legislation and Litigation
vol. 6, no. 2. 1983: 455.
Posted for Educational use only. The printed edition remains canonical. For citational use please visit the local law library or obtain a back issue.

Minnesota Gun Laws

INTRODUCTION

Minnesota’s gun control statute[1] was enacted in 1975 in response to the rising tide of Crime in the state.[2] To help allay the fears of gun owners and meet the criticism of opponents, the bill’s supporters stressed the limited nature of the bill.[3] Unlike prior proposals, the law does not contain any provisions for registration of handguns or for confiscation of illegally possessed handguns.[4] Also, the statute deals only with pistols,[5] not with rifles or other long guns.[6]

In addressing the issue, the legislature identified the problem as possession of handguns by violence-prone persons and possession of handguns in public places. The legislature sought to attack this problem in three ways. First, the law seeks to prevent ownership of handguns by violence-prone and irresponsible persons. Second, the law prohibits the carrying of handguns in public except under limited circumstances. Third, the law places restrictions on the transfer of handguns.

The purpose of this article is to review the main provisions of the statute, the legislative history, and the Minnesota Supreme, Court’s interpretation of these provisions.

CLASSES OF PERSONS NOT ALLOWED TO POSSESS HANDGUNS

The first major section of the statute concerns persons who are [Page 456] not allowed to possess a handgun under any circumstances. The purpose of this section is to keep handguns out of the possession of persons who are believed to be violence-prone and irresponsible.[7] The legislature believed that such persons are more likely to commit a crime with a handgun or unintentionally injure another person.

The determination of the specific classes set forth in the statute is based on statistical studies. According to studies cited by proponents of the handgun bill, a high correlation exists between the groups specified and gun crimes. One study conducted in the early 1970’s found that 90 percent of gun-crime offenders within a three year period belonged to one of the five classes. The majority were previous offenders; 37 percent of those committing gun crimes had prior records.[8]

Five classes of persons are prohibited from possessing handguns.[9] These are: (1) individuals who have been convicted of a crime of violence in any jurisdiction, unless 10 years have passed since the individual’s civil rights have been restored or his sentence has expired and provided that he has not been convicted of a second crime of violence in that period; (2) individuals who have been committed as "mentally ill ... .. mentally deficient," or "dangerous to the public," unless they are no longer suffering from the disability; (3) juveniles under 18 years of age who do not fall within one of the four specified exceptions; [10] (4) individuals who have been convicted of unlawful use, possession or sale of a controlled substance (other than a small amount of marijuana) or have been committed for treatment for the habitual use of a controlled substance; and (5) individuals confined or committed as an "inebriate person" unless they possess proof that they have not abused alcohol during the previous two years.

Possession of a handgun by an individual in the first class is a felony. Possession by an individual in any of the other classes is a misdemeanor.[11] [Page 457]

To establish a violation under this section, the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Olson held that the prosecution must show actual or constructive possession of a handgun by the defendant.[12] Under this rule, it is sufficient for the State to prove that the defendant consciously exercised dominion or control over a handgun. In Olson the court applied the same test for constructive possession of handguns that it employs in narcotics possession cases.[13]

The defendant in Olson was charged with being a felon in possession of a handgun. The gun was discovered in a search of defendant’s car following an arrest on other charges. The butt of the pistol was sticking out from under the driver’s seat, within the defendant’s reach. A cylinder loaded with six bullets for the gun was also found on the front seat. On the basis of these facts, the court held that the State had established the defendant was in constructive possession of the pistol.[14]

The second element of the offense requires that the defendant be within one of the five categories of persons prohibited from having firearms. Particularly with respect to felons, the court has noted the possibility of prejudice resulting from the presentation of the defendant’s prior criminal record. On two occasions the court suggested that the prosecution and defense agree to a stipulation on the issue so that the evidence of defendant’s record would not go to the jury." Absent such a stipulation, however, evidence of a prior crime will not result in prejudicial error. In State v. Lloyd, [16] the prosecution, on cross-examination, brought out evidence concerning the defendant’s use of a handgun in prior offenses. The court held that because the defendant did not attempt to reach a stipulation, the production of the evidence was not prejudicial.[17] [Page 458]

PERMITS TO CARRY

The second major section of the statute concerns restraints on the carrying of pistols in public. Under the statute it is unlawful for any person to possess a handgun in public without first having obtained a permit to carry it." In State v. Paige, the Minnesota Supreme Court identified what it considers to be the "sound public policy" supporting the provisions: "The statute is intended to prevent the possession of firearms in places where they are most likely to cause harm in the wrong hands, i.e., in public places where their discharge may injure or kill intended or unintended victims," except where an individual has demonstrated a need to carry a gun and sufficient responsibility. [19]

The court has interpreted two aspects of this provision. The issues which have been considered are: who bears the burden of proof as to lack of a permit to carry, and what must be shown to obtain a permit.

In State v. Paige,[20] the defendant was charged with possession of a handgun in public without a permit to carry. Although the case was decided on other grounds, the court took the opportunity to discuss which party bears the burden of proof as to possession of a permit. Because the prosecution must always prove all elements of an offense, the question became whether lack of a permit was an element of the crime or whether possession of a permit was an affirmative defense to be put into issue by the defendant. The Supreme Court found that possession of a permit was an affirmative defense.[21] [Page 459]

In so concluding, the court found that there is nothing inherently unfair in requiring defendants to produce evidence of a permit, because they have the prior opportunity to present the evidence and thus avoid prosecution. To reach its conclusion, the court relied on a Michigan Supreme Court decision on the same issue. In People v. Henderson,[22] the Michigan court construed the Michigan gun law, which is similar to the Minnesota law.[23] The Henderson court held that upon a showing that defendant was in possession of a pistol in a proscribed place, a prima facie case of a violation of the statute had been made out. The defendant then had the burden of offering some proof that he had a license to carry a handgun. As part of its holding, the Henderson court also found that the language in the statute "without a license to carry" did not add an element to the crime.[24]

In Paige, the court adopted the view of the Michigan court that the defendant had to present evidence of a permit to rebut the prosecution’s prima facie case. The burden then shifted back to the prosecution to show that the permit was invalid.[25]

The Supreme Court has also construed the requirements necessary to obtain a permit to carry a gun. To receive a permit individuals must establish that they are presented with an "occupation or personal safety hazard." [26] On the two occasions in which there was an issue as to whether a hazard justified the granting of a permit to carry, the court used a narrow interpretation of the statute.[27] [Page 460]

In Blore v. Mossey,[28] the plaintiff sought a permit to carry a handgun when traveling between his home and business. Although the statute specifically provides that no permit is necessary in these circumstances, Blore argued that because he could still be arrested and detained for not having a permit, the lack of one would have a "chilling" effect on his right to carry a pistol.[29] The hazard he faced was the possibility of arrest. Plaintiff argued alternatively that the statute required only that he show a need for the tangible document, not the handgun, and he had shown the requisite need.[30]

The court rejected plaintiff’s "tortured construction of the statute."[31] It found that because the plaintiff’s theory would lead to granting permits in these circumstances, it was contrary to the intent of the legislature, to restrict the number of permits. The court did not attempt to define what would constitute a sufficient hazard requiring a permit to carry a gun.

In its subsequent decision in In re Atkinson,[32] however, the court began to construct a general outline of what is considered to be a sufficient hazard. In Atkinson, the plaintiff argued that travelling appreciable distances on the highway at night was a personal safety hazard justifying the granting of a permit.[33] The State argued that plaintiff’s speculative hazard was shared with the general public and was not therefore personal. The purpose of the statute would be frustrated by accepting plaintiffs view because "everyone travels upon the public highways and would, therefore, be entitled to a permit."[34] Furthermore, plaintiff’s fear of "possible attack by pathological personalities" would not be absolved by allowing him to carry a handgun. On the contrary, the danger would be increased because such persons could arguably obtain handgun permits also.[35]

The court agreed with the State, calling the hazard "vague, general and speculative."[36] A major concern of the court’s was that the hazard was a common one: "We find it difficult to believe that such [Page 461] travel was intended by the legislature to be a personal safety hazard. To accept plaintiff’s argument would ‘gut’ the statute; virtually every person could get a permit to carry a loaded pistol in the glove compartment of his or her car."[37] In further support for its conclusion, the court cited a number of decisions from other jurisdictions concerning permits to carry pistols. Two main concerns are apparent in these cases: a hazard may be so common that it is shared by many persons, and a hazard may be mere speculation. A further concern underlying some of the decisions is the idea that carrying a handgun will not protect the potential victim anyway.[38]

The Minnesota court’s main concern is that a particular hazard justifying a permit to carry must not be a common one, i.e., it must not be shared by many others. Otherwise, the purpose of the statute, to limit the number of handguns in public, would be defeated. This requirement has been used by courts in other jurisdictions with statutes similar to the Minnesota law as the main bar to granting applications and in turn limiting the number of handguns possessed in public places.[39] A corollary to the requirement of a unique and particular hazard is that the applicant must face a real and immediate danger. Mere speculation or unwarranted fear is not enough to establish a sufficient hazard under the court’s decisions.

A related issue is that even given the fact that an applicant [Page 462] faces a unique hazard which is real and immediate, a handgun would not provide a sufficient measure of protection to warrant allowing the person to carry a gun in public. While the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed this issue, it has in quoted favorably from decisions in other jurisdictions advocating this point.[40] A number of courts have denied permits to carry on the basis of the limited protection a handgun would provide, especially when balanced against the policy of allowing an over abundance of persons from carrying handguns in public. Under the current interpretation of the statute, it appears likely that the Minnesota Supreme Court will eventually adopt this position.

TRANSFER REQUIREMENTS

The third major section of the statute concerns the transfer of handguns. Under the rules which were added in 1977, prior to any transfer of a handgun the transferor and transferee must file for a transfer permit with the chief of police. If the police reject the application, the transfer may not take place. If, however, a person has previously obtained a transferee permit or a permit to carry, then the transaction does not need to be reported and approved.[42]

The purpose of the rules is twofold. First, persons whom the legislature considers violence-prone and irresponsible are prevented from legally buying handguns, because no permit or transfer approval will be granted if the recipient is within one of the five classes of persons not allowed to possess a handgun.[43] Second, the rules prevent an individual from obtaining a gun while in the heat of passion or in a depressed state of mind. In transactions which do not involve an individual who already has a permit to carry or a transferee permit, the transfer is delayed for several days pending approval of the transfer.[44] The legislature adopted this rule to prevent persons from obtaining a gun while in an irrational state and unintentionally injuring another. During legislative hearings witnesses testified that most killings involve persons who know each other and are the result of rash actions taken while the individual is distraught. The law is designed to prevent individuals from obtaining guns while in such a state of mind, in the hope that by the time the trans- [Page 463] fer is approved the individual will no longer be distraught. Although some transfers may take place immediately, these are limited to cases where a person has obtained a permit and has thus shown responsibility and the capability of handling a gun safely.[46]

There are several exceptions to the transfer report rule.[47]

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE

Only once have Minnesota’s gun laws been challenged on constitutional grounds. In In re Atkinson the plaintiff challenged the statute under Article I, Section 16 of the Minnesota constitution.[49]

Although the State constitution does not contain an express reference to a right to bear arms, the plaintiff in Atkinson argued that there was such a natural common law right among the historical principles in existence when the United States Constitution was formulated. The United States Constitution guarantees each State a republican form of government, the plaintiff argued, and in turn this requires that State constitutions be interpreted in a way which is consistent with historical principles. If a right to bear arms existed at common law, then as an historical republican principle, any inter- [Page 464] pretation of the Minnesota State Constitution had to be consistent with this right.[50] In essence, if there was a common law right to bear arms it was included in Article I, Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution.

The fact that a common law right to bear arms existed was the crucial premise of the plaintiffs argument. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this premise, and the plaintiffs entire argument fell. "Whatever the scope of any common-law or constitutional right to bear arms, we hold that it is not absolute and does not guarantee to individuals the right to carry loaded weapons abroad at all times and in all circumstances."[51]

The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that

[c]ourts and legal scholars, considering the same historical documents that appellant uses to support his common-law right to carry weapons for self-defense, have reached the conclusion that any such right was not absolute. "Weapon bearing was never treated as anything like an absolute right by the common law. It was regulated by statute as to time and place as far back as the Statute of Northampton in 1328 and on many occasions since." United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3rd Cir. 1942); Burton P. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 99-100, 248 A.2d 521 (1968), appeal dismissed 394 U.S. 812, 89 S.Ct. 1486, 22 L.Ed.2d 748 (1969); see 79 Am. Jur.2d, Weapons and Firearms, § 4 (1975).[52]

Indeed, according to another scholar quoted by the court, "[w]hatever the purpose of [the Statute of North Hampton], . . . it shows that a right to keep and bear arms was not regarded as a fundamental right of every Englishman." [53] Yet another commentator quoted by the court concluded that "[n]owhere is there any respectable authority for the proposition that, as of 1791, a guarantee of the right to bear arms extended generally to personal self-defense as that concept was applied in either the common law or in any constitutional system." [54] There being no absolute common law right to bear arms, the court concluded that "the state may reasonably exercise its police power to regulate the carrying of weapons by [Page 465] individuals in the interest of public safety."[55]

CONCLUSION

Whether a statute will be effective in preventing firearm violence depends on a combination of three factors. First, the legislature must correctly identify the underlying causes of firearm violence. Second, it must address the problem with appropriate legislation and must be permitted by its constituents to do so. Third, the judicial interpretation of the legislation must be consonant with the legislative purpose.

The cause of firearm violence identified by the Minnesota legislature is comprised of two elements: violence prone and irresponsible people possessing handguns, and the proliferation of handguns in public places. The legislature has attempted to address the problem, but not without strong opposition. In each attempt to pass firearms legislation gun owners have been steadfastly opposed to any such legislation. Also, gun control opponents have pressed for an amendment to the Minnesota Constitution guaranteeing the right to bear arms.[56] Although they have been unsuccessful thus far, there still exists a great deal of opposition in Minnesota to gun control. If the legislature gives in to these forces and adopts such an amendment, the gun control statute win be subject to closer constitutional scrutiny, which could affect the court’s interpretation of the statute.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted the statute in such a way as to effectuate the purposes of the law.[57] For example, the court has set a high standard for the establishment of a need to carry a gun in public. Such an interpretation is necessary if the statute is to effectively attack the problems which the legislature has identified. If the law becomes subject to close constitutional scrutiny, the interpretation may become more limited and hence less effective.

In adopting the gun control statute, the legislature has identified the cause of firearm violence as consisting of possession of handguns by violence prone persons and possession of handguns in [Page 466] public places.[58] The statute and the court’s interpretation of the law directly address these problems. Thus the statute should be effective in attacking the problem as identified by the legislature. Whether the legislature has properly identified the underlying cause of firearm violence, however, remains to be seen.

Richard D. Owen

1. MINN. STAT. § 624.71 (1982).

2. Hearings on H.F. 679 Before the Crime Prevention and Corrections Comm., 69th Sess. (1975).

3. Id.

4. H.F. 791, introduced in the 1973 legislative session, included provisions for registration of handguns and for confiscation of unlawfully possessed handguns. The bill was postponed indefinitely. 1973 House Journal at 435, 1240, 2188.

5. "Pistol" includes a weapon designed to be fired by the use of a single hand and with an overall length of less than 26 inches, or having a barrel or barrels of a length less than 18 inches in the case of a shotgun or having a barrel of a length of less than 16 inches in the case of a rifle (a) from which may be fired or ejected one or more solid projectiles by means of cartridge or shell by the action of an explosive or the igniting of flammable or explosive substances; or (b) for which the propelling force is a spring, elastic band, carbon dioxide, air or other gas, or vapor. MINN. STAT. § 624.712(2) (1982).

Firearms which are considered antique firearms are excluded from the statute. MINN. STAT. § 624.715 (1982). Antique firearms include guns which were manufactured before 1899 and replicas of such guns which are designed or intended to use conventional ammunition. MINN. STAT. § 624.712(3) (1982).

6. MINN. STAT. § 624.711 (1982).

7. Id.

8. Hearings on H.F. 679 Before the Crime Prevention and Corrections Comm., 69th Sess. (1975).

9. MINN. STAT. § 624.713 (1982).

10. The circumstances in which juveniles may possess guns are: (1) in actual presence or under supervision of parent or guardian; (2) for the purpose of military drill under competent supervision; (3) for the purpose of instruction, competition or target practice if approved by the police and under direct supervision; and (4) if the person has successfully completed an approved pistol safety and marksmanship course. Id.

11. Id.

12. State v. Olson, 326 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1982).

13.

[T]o prove constructive possession the state should have to show (a) that the police found the substance in a place under defendant’s exclusive control to which other people did not normally have access, or (b) that, if police found it in a place to which others had access, there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over it.

State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 105, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1975).

14. Id. at 114, 326 N.W.2d at 622.

15. State v. Lloyd, 321 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1982); State v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 505, 507 (Minn. 1979).

16. 321 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1982).

17. The court has not addressed the question of whether there would be undue Prejudice if the prosecution refused an offer by the defendant for a stipulation on the prior conviction issue.

18. MINN. STAT. § 624.714(l) (1982). No permit is required of a person to:

(1) keep or carry a pistol about his home or place of business, dwelling house, premises or land owned by him; (2) carry a pistol from a place of purchase, or to and from a place where repairs are made, to his dwelling house and place of business; (4) carry a pistol in the woods or fields upon the waters of this state for the purpose of hunting or of target shooting in a state area; or (5) transport a pistol in a motor vehicle, snowmobile or boat if the pistol is unloaded, contained in a closed and fastened case, gunbox, or securely tied package.

Id. § 624.714(9).

To obtain a permit to carry persons must: (1) not be within one of the five classes of persons who are not to have pistols; (2) provide satisfactory proof of their ability to handle a pistol safely; and (3) have an occupation or personal safety hazard requiring a permit to carry. Id. § 624.714(5).

Applications for permits to carry are made to the local chief of police or county sheriff. Id. § 624.714(2).

19. State v. Paige, 256 N.W.2d 298, 303 (Minn. 1977).

20. Id.

21. Id. at 304.

22. 391 Mich. 612, 218 N.W.2d 2 (1974).

23. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.222 (1982) provides that any person carrying a pistol without a license is guilty of a felony.

24. 391 Mich. at 614, 218 N.W.2d at 4.

25. 256 N.W.2d at 304. It should be noted that though Paige was decided on other grounds and the discussion of the burden of proof is therefore dicta, the decision is of value because the court has since cited favorably from Paige. See In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1980) (court relied on the Paige rationale).

26. MINN. STAT. § 624.714(5) (1982).

27. Prior to the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the issue, a contrary view had been accepted by at least one lower court. A broad reading of the requirement of a hazard was adopted based on the statute’s Declaration of Policy. The preamble states, "It is not the intent of the legislature to regulate shotguns, rifles and other longguns of the type commonly used for hunting and not defined as pistols . . . or otherwise restrict the use of pistols by law-abiding citizens." MINN. STAT. § 624.711 (1982) (emphasis added). The District Court of Washington County accepted this view in In re Vruno, No. 46,702 (Minn. D. Ct. 1978), a case involving an applicant who claimed that travelling appreciable distances at night was a personal safety hazard. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff: "In light of [the Declaration of Policy] the requirement of ‘personal safety hazard’ should be read fairly broadly in instances such as this one where a law-abiding citizen merely desires to continue a long-standing practice." Id.

In the most recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision on this issue the Vruno rationale was explicitly rejected. The court said that the preamble must give way to the specific provisions of the statute, which have been interpreted more narrowly. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.

28. 311 Minn. 288, 249 N.W.2d 447 (1976).

29. Brief for Appellant at 6, Blore v. Mossey, 311 Minn. 288, 249 N.W.2d 447 (1976).

30. Id. at 7.

31 Id. at 290, 249 N.W.2d at 448.

32. 291 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1980).

33. Id. at 400.

34. Brief for Respondent at 6, In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1980).

35. Id. at 7.

36. 291 N.W.2d at 400-01.

37. Id.

38. The court in Siccardi v. State, 59 N.J. 545, 284 A.2d 533 (1971), relied in part on expert testimony that carrying a pistol would hardly afford any measure of protection to plaintiff, but would instead involve the danger of misuse or accidental use. There might be a sufficient need, the court said, if there were a "real danger’ to ones life as evidenced by serious threats or attacks. Id at 552, 284 A.2d at 540.

39. In Siccardi v. State, 59 N.J. 545, 284 A.2d 533 (1971), the plaintiff sought to carry a loaded pistol when going from his theater to the bank depository late at night. At that time New Jersey required permits to carry, which were granted upon a showing of sufficient need. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 151-41, -44 (West 1969).

He carried large sums of money, travelled in a dangerous section of the city, and had been threatened in person and on the telephone. Despite what appeared to be a particular and real hazard, the court denied plaintiff’s application for a permit to carry. Granting of the permit would "open the way to grants of handgun permits to countless businessmen who feel uncomfortable carrying large sums of money, ‘Surely such widespread handgun possession in the streets, somewhat reminiscent of frontier days, would not be at all in the public interest.’" 59 N.J. at 552, 284 A.2d at 540.

One case in which a permit was granted under a statute similar to Minnesota’s is In re Blumenfeld, 89 Misc. 837, 393 N.Y.S. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (compare New York’s gun law at N.Y. Penal Law § 400 (McKinney 1981)). There the petitioner, an attorney and landlord, worked in a blighted area of the Bronx christened "Fort Apache" by the police. The court said that "‘Lawless elements have transformed the area into an armed camp." Based on this and the fact that petitioner had been physically threatened, the court found that the petitioner had -demonstrated sufficient need for a license to carry a pistol.

40. 291 N.W.2d at 400.

41. MINN. STAT. § 624.7132 (1982).

42. Id.

43. Id. § 624.7132(5).

44. Hearings on H.F. 800 Before the Law Enforcement Subcomm., 70th Sess. (1977).

45. Id.

46. According to former Attorney General Warren Spannaus, who testified before legislative committees in support of the bill, the rules would have a definite positive effect. He cited a five-year study which showed that forty percent of persons who killed others with handguns would be denied the chance to buy a pistol under the new rules. Hearings on H.F. 800 Before the Law Enforcement Subcommittee, 70th Sess. (1977).

47. These are:

(1) transfers between federally licensed firearms dealers; (2) transfers of antique firearms as curiosities or for their historical value; (3) transfers by order of court or involuntary transfers and transfers at death; (4) a transfer by an individual other than a federally licensed firearms dealer to a prospective transferee for less than one day; (5) delivery of a pistol for repairs; (6) a loan between persons at a firearms collectors’ exhibition; (7) a loan between persons lawfully engaged in hunting or target shooting if the loan is for less than twelve hours; (8) loan between law enforcement officers; and (9) a loan between employees or employer and employee if the employee is required as part of the job to carry a pistol and has a valid permit to carry.

MINN. STAT. § 624.7132(12) (1982).

48. The statute was challenged under the Minnesota Constitution. Plaintiff did not ground his argument in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." The Minnesota Supreme Court said that there "seems little doubt that the Second Amendment would have no application to this case[,]" and the court believed the statute would still be likely to be found constitutional in the face of a second amendment challenge. In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 3%, 398, n.1 (Minn. 1980).

49. MINN. CONST., art. I, § 16, provides: "The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the people."

50. 291 N.W.2d at 398.

51. Id. at 399.

52. Id. at 398, quoting United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942).

53. 291 N.W.2d at 398, quoting Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 473, 473-74 (1915).

54. 291 N.W.2d at 399, quoting Mosk, Gun Control Legislation: Valid and Necessary, 14 NEW YORK L.F. 694, 707 (1968).

55. 291 N.W.2d at 399.

56. A proposed amendment introduced in the 1981 legislative session provided for an additional section which would state: "The right of a citizen to possess and use arms for recreation, for marksmanship training, or for the defense of home, person or property shall not be abridged."

57. See In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. 1980).

58. State v. Paige, 256 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1977).