"LAW ENFORCEMENT LOBBYING AND POLICY MAKING ON "GUN CONTROL"
Paul H. Blackman, Ph.D
Research Coordinator
NRA-ILA
Reprinted With permission of the National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action. Originally presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Washington, D.C., April 1, 1989.
Introduction
Prior to 1982, although several police organizations had passed various resolutions regarding the regulation of firearms in America, and occasionally testified before congressional committees, there was little in the way of lobbying. And the testimony was generally fairly low-key and involved a specific issue before a particular committee of the U.S. Congress. Even when the apparent primary, purpose of testifying was to counteract testimony of the National Rifle Association (NRA) - as when the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) testified in support of the nomination of Norval Morris to be Law Enforcement Assistance Administrator in 1978 - the testimony was positive and did not criticize those who might disagree. For that matter, there was diversity in views on the gun issue among the various police organizations, with the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) writing positive Letters to the editor of the NRA publication, The American Rifleman, in 1976, and testifying in support of the NRA-backed Firearms Owners' Protection Act (FOPA) in 1983. Similar support for that piece of legislation was voiced by the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA).
In some ways, the organizations' activities with regard to firearms-related matters reflected their activities with regard to most issues concerning Law enforcement. They testified, but were not particularly active in lobbying, at least in part because only limited lobbying would be considered lawful for tax-exempt organizations. And, since the NRA has been active in training police and police instructors, organizing competitive shooting for law enforcement officers, and regularly exhibiting at the annual meetings of law enforcement organizations, relations between the NRA and the police, whether in precise agreement or moderate agreement, were amicable. Indeed, such positive relations were highlighted by the fact that over 90 percent of the California sheriffs and police chiefs who took stands on the controversial effort to "freeze" the number of handguns in that state sided with the NRA's effort to defeat the anti-gun initiative in 1982. That concerted effort regarding proposition 15 marked the highlight and, in some way the start of the diminution, of law enforcement organizations' cooperation with the NRA on the gun issue.
The change was gradual, but between 1982 and 1984, political leaders of various police organizations began to change their attitude toward the NRA, and in 1985, organized to actively lobby against the positions of the NRA, coalescing, with the good offices of Handgun Control, Inc. (HCI) and, Informally, by some employees of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (BATF), into the Law Enforcement Steering Committee Against S.49, the Firearms Owners' Protection Act (FOPA) (later, following passage of S.49, becoming just LESC).
The spur for the change was the so-called "cop killer" bullet issue, which came to life in early 1982, spurred by the Beverly Hills Gun Club, Representative Mario Biaggi (former New York City policeman), and the news media. The ammunition at issue was a hard Teflon-coated bullet, designed for law enforcement officers who might have to shoot at criminals who were wearing soft-body armor or who were behind some other form of protection. It had never been available to the general public, and, indeed, during the fifteen years between its invention and its formal ban, there were no documented instances of vest-wearing officers' being shot with such ammunition, and only three allegations that criminals were in possession of ft. The NRA's concern was that advertising the officers' vests, and the ammunition which could penetrate it (virtually) any rifle rounds above .22 caliber, along with slugs, and large-bore handgun ammunition, would endanger law enforcement officers. Lobbying by the NRA was impaired by the request from some Reagan administration officials that the NRA not publicize the potential dangers to law enforcement by identifying specific calibers as being capable of penetrating the armor.
The ammunition in question - and any other so-called armor-piercing (AP) ammunition - posed no real threat to law enforcement. Ballistically, such ammunition makes less devastating wounds than ordinary ammunition when it strikes anyone not wearing soft body-armor; an estimated half of the officers in the nation were issued such vests, but a Dupont marketing survey reported that just 10% of those officers regularly wore it. For over 90% of the nation's law enforcement officers, then, AP ammunition would be less dangerous or equally as harmful. Nonetheless, the publicity posed a threat, and the NRA was able to cooperate and accept restrictive bullet legislation that ultimately passed so long as: innocent possession or sale was not affected (much of the ammunition which could be classified as AP was sold as military surplus and even gun dealers would not know Its capabilities); and ammunition used for sport or protection was not affected. In some instances, this meant state and local laws and ordinances were approved within months of the issue being raised. With Congress, however, the first few years saw legislative proposals which would have banned up o 85% of big-game hunting ammunition, and so the issue stayed, festering at the relations between law enforcement organizations and the NRA. The issue was resolved in the U.S. Congress with passage of Public Law 99-408 (1986), of which House sponsor Biaggi said,"…our final legislative product was not some watered-down version of what we set out to do. In the end, there was no compromise on the part of police safety…." Law enforcement political leaders, however, continued to use the issue to fan lingering police misunderstandings and disaffection with the NRA.
Since the initial split, several organizations seemingly sought vengeance on the NRA by opposing other legislative proposals and, indeed, organizing the LESC to lobby in support of national issues supported by all of the members of that organization. As ft happens, virtually the only such issues uniting the voice Of most of organized law enforcement were, curiously, those related to the NRA - and testimony and statements generally attack the NRA rather than, as before, addressing the legislative issues alone. The LESC was first organized to oppose the FOPA, with help from HCI, and with sub rosa assistance from such BATF personnel as Phil McGuire, who later retired from BATF and went to work for HCI. The BATF personnel had some reason for concern, since the bill was written to redress grievances perceived in the enforcement of the Gun Control Act of 1968 by agents of BATF. No other law enforcement officers were really affected at all by FOPA.
Since then, the LESC has gotten involved on the issue of the so-called plastic" gun, another non-issue since such guns have not yet been invented, and the technology for a non-metal handgun is believed to be at least 10-25 years off. On the other hand, technology for detecting plastics has been moving ahead rapidly. The NRA argued that the serious threat of plastics was in explosives, which did exist, and which might well be used by terrorists. Such ideas were perceived but slowly by others, and ignored by the news media, which had long lobbied against the NRA and law enforcement, and were clearly enjoying what seemed to be a rift.
In addition, at the federal level, many law enforcement organizations lobbied in support of a seven-day waiting period with an optional (to local police) background investigation prior to the dealer transfer of a handgun. At the local level, several law enforcement officials fought against NRA efforts to ease prohibitions on the concealed carrying of protective handguns by private citizens - although others supported the NRA's efforts at reforms. In Maryland, much of organized law enforcement supported first legislation, then a referendum, to ban the so called "Saturday Night Special," although the actual bill banned "certain handguns" to be determined by a commission to be named after the legislation took effect. In some states, law enforcement officials have also lobbied heavily for bans on semi-automatic rifles shotguns, and handguns. Curiously, there has been little organized lobbying at the federal or state levels by law-enforcement organizations o topics of which used to be considered of concern to policemen; capital punishment; the exclusionary rule; benefits for officers (and heirs) wounded or killed in the line of duty; federal assistance to local law-enforcement in terms of funding, equipment, or technology. Most of the concerted federal efforts by law-enforcement organizations has been aimed at lobbying for what the NRA opposed or opposing what the NRA supported.
In addition to providing the seeming appearance of determining its agenda by looking at NRA's and taking the opposite stance, many national law-enforcement activists directly attacked the NRA in a variety of ways. Several police chiefs and two heads of the FOP appeared in ads for HCI based on the slogan, "Has the NRA gone off the deep end?" Others called for boycotts of NRA courses and competitions, asked police officers to give up their memberships in the NRA, and called for the development of alternatives to the NRA's law-enforcement training and certification Programs.
The various activities, and the way in which they have been carried out, raise a number of issues on how law enforcement Officials and organizations act and interact when they get politically active. Among the issues of concern to those supportive of the American democratic tradition are: First Amendment issues, including the rights of citizens to disagree with police organizations, the rights of policy making and non-policymaking officers to get politically involved, and the threats of politically-motivated law-enforcement; potentially unlawful actions by law-enforcement in support of its political goals; and the credibility of law-enforcement testimony and statements related to political issues, as well as the general Problem of possible conflicts with organizational attachment or hostility toward private groups involved with issues beyond the Primary scope of law-enforcement.
First Amendment IssuesBaltimore County Police Chief Cornelius Behan, speaking on behalf of the Police Foundation - one of several organizations fathered or godfathered by Patrick Murphy with funding from the Ford Foundation - orally complained to a congressional committee that it did not seem fair that law enforcement should have to lobby for the legislation it wanted approved or defeated just like it was any other interest group.
Behan's attitude was an interesting one, suggesting that law-enforcement should have a favored position when it comes to lobbying or endorsing certain political goals. He seems displeased that legislators might have to pay as much attention to the NRA as to law-enforcement organizations, and might actually have to persuade rather than merely assert that something was a good or bad idea. Similarly, Jerald R. Vaughn complained bitterly that the NRA was seeking to prevent actively anti-gun police officers and chiefs from being able to obtain some appointive positions in law enforcement (Crime Control Digest, July 18, 1988). Said Vaughn "It is especially ironic that the NRA, so dedicated to the protection of the constitutional right to bear arms, is so oblivious to the constitutional protection of free speech provided law enforcement executives by the First Amendment."
At the same time, anti-gun chiefs have limited the activities of their subordinates by decrees or intimidation. For example, while appearing in an HCI ad in uniform himself, San Jose Police Chief Joseph McNamara prohibited one of his pro-gun, pro-NRA subordinates, Leroy Pyle, from similarly being uniformed while endorsing the NRA. A spokesman explained that if Pyle had been speaking against the NRA, he might have been allowed to wear his uniform (San Jose Mercury News, Dec. 6,1987). In addition, Pyle has been reassigned to lower duties, and was chastised for an off-duty speech more severely than the formal reviewers recommended on the express orders of Chief McNamara
In the Maryland referendum on the ban of handguns, officers supporting the ban were allowed to campaign during working hours, while those opposed were intimidated from open expression. Indeed, the Superintendent of State Police ordered his officers to have nothing to do with any NRA program while in uniform, including those which were clearly unrelated to the gun issue, such as competitive shooting events.
Behan, Vaughn, and McNamara seem totally to misunderstand the First Amendment and who it covers. The NRA has First Amendment rights, being a private organization, representing individuals with the rights of speech, press, assembly and petition. Policy makers in the field do not have First Amendment rights; government has power and authority, not rights, and the same is true of its representatives. Speaking nearly a century ago, Massachusetts Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., said, "the policeman may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." (McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass 216,1892)
A more recent Supreme Court decision has weakened the strength of Justice Holmes's view, but only by giving some freedom of expression to non-policymaking law enforcement officers, in the case at hand, one who had expressed approval of the shooting of President Ronald Reagan. (Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 1987)
Constitutionally, then, the NRA has almost unlimited constitutional authority to express its views and to attempt to hold policymakers responsible. The NRA has as much right to attempt to influence the naming of a police chief as the election of a mayor or the confirmation of any other official. Second in order of constitutional protection would be the non-policymaking law enforcement officers who may freely express their views, particularly off-duty, so long as the expression does not interfere with the carrying out of their duties.
And the persons lacking in constitutional protections for their views are policy-making offices, particularly chiefs, who are political appointees, subject to the ordinary workings of the political process. They may certainly have and express such views, but they are Politically accountable for that expression, and it is perfectly appropriate for any private organization to attempt to hold such political figures accountable - whether that private organization is the NRA or HCI.
Behan's notion that it is somehow unfair for police spokesmen to have to defend their views is contradicted by research. Fyfe (1988: 173) has noted that evidence on an issue has not necessarily prevented police leaders from taking a contrary view. Police chiefs are not necessarily experts at criminology, and are frequently ignorant of academic research on a variety of issues. Certainly their testimony on matters they believe of concern should be heard but such testimony, despite Behan's views, should not be seen as necessarily binding on legislative bodies.
Police powers to abuse First Amendment rightsAnother problem related to police activism on particular issues is the possibility that police powers may be used to punish persons for criticism. Such action is not inevitable, and law enforcement can be active in politicking without becoming vengeful. It is, however, a concern, and one which has not yet been well met by anti-gun activists in the field of law enforcement. The concern of criminologists and others interested in a fair discussion of controversial issues is that excessive zeal on the part of persons in law enforcement puts them in a position not merely to punish through abuse of police powers, but the power to intimidate so that some people may prefer self-censorship to risking the wrath of those with the authority to enforce criminal statutes.
Unfortunately, with regard to the gun issue, there are numerous instances of police abusing their powers. And no one can estimate the effectiveness of the "chilling effect" police activism has had on the free expression of ideas. Critics of the BATF have long suspected they were Wing singled out for harsher investigations, particularly if they were serious gun collectors or dealers. One recent instance involved Howard Shaw in Florida, who was prosecuted in 1984, on 86 criminal counts of violating provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968. The violations consisted of minor, inadvertent, technical record-keeping errors; none of the counts involved fraud. Mr. Shaw faced up to 440 years in prison and $440,000 in fines. The jury acquitted Shaw on all counts not dismissed by the court.
Other examples are clearly not coincidence. A couple, who were being investigated for drug violations in Florida, were singled out for special treatment of their arrest because they were NRA members. Indeed, the police sought a no-knock warrant --for which there is no provision in Florida law - because the couple were pro-gun activists, and claiming the threat that NRA members would have guns, initiated the search-and-seizure with a concussion grenade inflicting permanent injury on the couple. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit, arguing that expressing First Amendment views or exercising those rights by joining an organization with a particular political viewpoint, cannot serve as the basis for discriminatory treatment in the attempt to serve a warrant (Orlando Sentinel, Feb. 21, 1989).
In Rhode Island, the leading pro-gun activist in the state, Don diBiasio, who is also a firearms dealer, was in his shop following two break-ins where the thief rammed his way into the store with a stolen car and the stole some merchandise. While in the shop at night, a stolen car was driven into the front of the store, and diBiasio killed the burglar as he approached with a raised metal pipe. Police arrested diBiasio for murder, explaining to him, as they roughed him up a bit, that he deserved such treatment for selling guns to criminals to use against police. There have, of course, been no such instances noted, although a person who regularly broke into gunshops to steal guns would probably be more likely to have been a source of guns, which might have been used against law enforcement officers. The arrest was denounced by even the anti-gun local newspaper, and the grand jury refused to indict. But some anti-gun officers had made it clear that political views were to be considered in deciding what constituted a justifiable homicide.
An additional First Amendment issue was raised when Jerry Vaughn called upon police departments to consider requiring manufacturers to provide a statement of support for measures to keep guns out of the wrong hands as a condition of purchase of their products for police use (Crime Control Digest, July 18,1989). Since he was riot acting as the representative of a government agency, Vaughn's statements were constitutionally protected. But a governmental agency could no more require a manufacturer to support a particular political position than it could require it to endorse a particular political candidate as a condition of doing business in a particular municipality.
And while acknowledging privately that gun laws did no good, the Police Commissioner of Baltimore, Bishop Robinson, told NRA representatives that, since they had been successful in defeating police on FOPA, they owed police support, and, without any quid-pro-quo, called upon the NRA to endorse Robinson's views on drugs and the drug issue, although NRA's involvement in the drug issue is clearly outside the organization's mandate as enumerated in NRA's By-Laws. Whether the NRA's non-participation in Robinson's plan was related to his later position in support of the ban on certain handguns in the state is unclear.
The most recent and serious efforts by police activists to use their authority to discourage or interfere with the First Amendment rights developed as a result of that handgun ban in Maryland, referendum Question #3, on the November 1988 ballot. So active and aggressive were a few officers and leaders that they threatened not just free speech but free elections. It is difficult to evaluate, however, how much of the police activity in support of the gun ban was inspired by police activists and how much was conducted by law enforcement officers acting under orders from police superiors - which may be one of the potential problems of law enforcement being active in political disputes which are not clearly on law enforcement issues (salaries, benefits, overtime and off-duty activities, etc.).
Signs advocating "no" votes on Questions #3 were removed by some state police alleging (without an ordinance to support them) that the signs were too large to be on private property. Media inquiries caused that form of censorship to cease (Amo, 1989; Young, 1989). While police supervisors and non-policymaking officers were allowed to express support for Question #3, opponents of the measure were led to understand such support might affect their careers in law enforcement (Young, 1989). Again, the activities of non-policymaking officers are more Constitutionally protected than those of supervisors, but few such officers would risk making the waves necessary to be allowed freely to express themselves on an issue when that position is at odds with the political powers that be. And those powers made it clear that the NRA was the enemy when, in the midst of the campaign, Maryland State police Superintendent Tippett issued a memorandum to officers prohibiting activities sponsored by or affiliated with the NRA on duty or in uniform or identifying the officer as part of the law enforcement of Maryland. In this case, the prohibition went beyond support for or opposition to a particular Political issue, but proscribed being involved with an organization identified with a particular Position even in activities geared toward law enforcement and in no way concerned with political positions of either the NRA or participant police officers (Tippett, Special Order No. 01 -8832, Oct. 17,1989).
Perhaps the most blatant attack on First Amendment - and Fourth Amendment - rights occurred the night before the election. A supporter of Question #3 got a judge to issue a subpoena for certain documents after it was falsely alleged that the anti-Question #3 campaign was planning to use funds for certain activities prohibited by state law. Those activities - hiring people for certain electioneering activities - while prohibited by Maryland law, are probably constitutionally protected, based on a Supreme Court decision regarding a similar Colorado incident handed down earlier in 1988 (Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886,1988).
With media accompaniment, officers serving the subpoena ransacked the campaign headquarters looking for the Items alleged to exist. Constitutionally, a subpoena does not give the power to conduct a search and seizure; it is an order to produce particular persons or papers at a particular time. The police did not have a search warrant (Baltimore Sun, Nov. 12,1988). By telling the media the search was related to efforts by the anti-Question #3 campaign to have people at the polls, the news which went out was that it might be illegal for pro-gun activists to go to the polls for last-minute campaigning or for other purposes. This had a chilling effect on many persons who were planning to actively oppose Question #3 on election day. Certainly, fewer volunteers showed up than were expected, and some indicated that they feared their planned perfectly-legal election day activities were unlawful, and that was the reason for inaction (Young, 1989; Amo, 1989). Clearly, the election day loss of volunteer workers did not alter the outcome of the election, but the First Amendment and the concept of free elections does not require that governmental actions with a chilling effect after the outcome to be recognized as unconstitutional.
Even the vociferously anti-gun Baltimore Sun1 found the actions of law enforcement offensive, in an editorial called "Monday Night Special" (Nov. 15,1988):
The police knock on the door in the dark of the night, followed by rummaging through personal effects of any sort - but particularly those related to a political matter - is the hallmark of totalitarian societies. British abuse of so-called general warrants is what prompted the inclusion of the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. This sort of thing simply cannot be tolerated, even when it is the result of mistake or confusion. Police with political assignments are more dangerous than Saturday Night Specials (Emphasis added).
Election day itself saw some minor problems with police activity. A few officers - until the issue was raised with their superiors -showed up at the polls for last minute campaigning for Question #3 uniformed and armed. This would clearly be seen by Americans as governmental intimidation were the election in a foreign country. And there was some police harassment of pro-gun activists, such as the arrest of an elderly black woman who borrowed a chair from the school/polling place since she was tired Of standing, and was arrested for theft of the chair (Gun Week, Nov. 25,1988).
Clearly, if law enforcement officers wish, off duty, to participate in the political process, they are protected by the Constitution. But so are others who may disagree with some of those law enforcement officers. And law enforcement in a democracy has a clear obligation not to impose its views on others so as to violate their constitutional rights.
Law-breaking and lobbyingIn addition to limiting the lawful activities of others, some police activism has been accompanied by unlawful activities of various degrees of seriousness by law enforcement as individuals, as departments, or as groups. One concern gun owners have is that additional gun laws might invite further violations of the law in enforcing ft. Essentially, by violating existing law - or pushing it to a limit - a police department justifies to gun owners concerns about the fairness likely in enforcing laws giving police still more power. Combined with the fact that most of the law enforcement support for new legislation is not based on credible statements (vide infra), lawbreaking as a means of lobbying raises fears of ulterior motives and of arbitrary enforcement beyond that envisioned by the legislatures considering proposals.
Law breaking by law enforcement officials is unlikely to be punished unless ft involves monetary corruption (Fyfe, 1988:172), so breaking the law to lobby for gun laws does not involve risk of sanction. It does, however, risk weakening the moral authority of law enforcement and undermining citizen trust of police officers. If that was a societal concern in the 1960s, ft presumably may remain or become one in the 1 990s as well. Certainly citizens who learn that NRA membership may cause investigating officers to use a concussion grenade or who get arrested or intimidated at the polls may, in addition to submitting to the chilling effect intended, lose faith in the notion that the policeman is one's friend. The other side of discriminating against the NRA is discriminating for, and benefiting from working with HCI. Lobbying financial reports reveal that at least some of the expenses for law enforcement organizations which are actively involved in the debate over gun laws are borne by HCI. Several payments have been reported to such organizations as the Police Foundation. The favor is reciprocated by law enforcement officers and agents boosting HCI's fund raising efforts and attacking the NRA. When appearing on behalf of restrictive gun laws before a media audience, for example, the Police Foundation might give an endorsement for HCI where ft would normally endorse itself with name, address, and phone numbers (PBS, "Late Night America," March 25,1989).
Similarly, some departments are abandoning NRA training programs, not because they are unsatisfactory, but as a protest for NRA's taking a different "gun control" position from department officials. The law enforcement leadership encourages this, as Jerry Vaughn made clear in noting that one way to protest the NRA's actions was to withdraw support for NRA activities, particularly training and shooting events (Crime Control Digest, July 18,1988). The Maryland State Police (special Order No. 01-8832, Oct. 17, 1988) took that approach with regard to competitions, allowing participation in such events only if the officer "does not represent himself as a member of this Agency," which is the standard way of competing in NRA sponsored police competitions.
Withdrawing from NRA instruction for political reasons poses a slight risk to police departments. So long as the withdrawal does not weaken the quality of the training officers receive, there is no problem. But if an ill-trained officer's actions - ill-trained because of inadequate substitutions for NRA training - result in a suit against a municipality or police department, the fact that the training was less than adequate because the department was protesting the politic imposed. A recent Supreme Court decision (Canton v. Harris reported in Crime Control Digest, March 6, 1989), noted some circumstances where the failure to train amounts to "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact."
Armed and considered lobbyistsOne of the reasons for the separation of powers in the United States Constitutional system was a reaction to 17th century England, where armed militia surrounded the parliament building and intimidated enactment of particular legislation (particularly payment for soldiers). A modified version of that intimidation effort was used on Congress in 1986 when the Law Enforcement Steering Committee Against S.49 called on a couple of hundred officers to assist in its lobbying effort, and again in 1988 when LESC rallied another 200 officers in support of the so-called Brady Amendment to the drug bill and against the NRA-backed McCollum-Staggers substitute regarding the feasibility of an instantaneous background check on firearm (rifle, shotgun, and handgun) purchasers instead of a seven-day waiting period with optional background check on only handgun purchases.
Under the law of the District of Columbia, off-duty police Officers have no right or privilege to be armed; they are like any other citizen and their possession of a handgun not registered to them in the District by 1976 is prohibited. In addition, except in the line of duty, police officers are not entitled to be armed in the Capitol, on Capitol grounds, or in congressional office buildings. Those laws were violated in 1986 in order to present the appearance that organized law-enforcement was demanding that Congress accede to its demands, There was no explanation for the failure to enforce the District law, but the Capitol police explained that they had agreed to let the officers be armed.
The 1986 unlawful carrying was especially ironic since it preceded by less than one month a letter to Crime Control Digest by Jerry Vaughn (May 12, 1986) noting that law enforcement officers, when off duty, must comply with state laws: "...he is dutybound to ensure that the permission required is obtained if he chooses to carry his weapon with him. Those who would suggest any other course of action, quite simply, would be telling a police officer to break the law. Are these the folks who should be telling us what's good for public safety and what makes for effective law enforcement?" That remains a valid question.
The situation changes slightly in 1988. An LESC memorandum giving instructions to attending officers noted: "Because guns are not allowed in the hells of Congress, a substation where you can leave your weapons has been set up at the South Capitol Street entrance of the Longworth Building. The substation will be on your left as you enter the building. Violations of Capitol Hill gun restrictions could jeopardize the lobbying effort." (LESC, 1988)
The officers were still invited to have their firearms in Washington, D.C., and to march armed to the Capitol, accompanied by the chief of police of Washington, who had welcomed the officers to police headquarters. There was no question regarding the law or that D.C. police knew the law, ironically, because of the infamous case against Carl Rowan for having an unregistered gun which belonged to his son, a former FBI agent. The month before the armed march, the D.C. Corporation Counsel had sent the chief a memorandum saying that guns owned by police and law enforcement officers are not exempt from the D.C. law and must be registered (although registration was "frozen" as of 1976) (Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1988).
Similar campaigning by armed supporters of a particular measure occurred in Maryland during the Question #3 debate. Officers would carry some concealed small handguns to be whipped out during appropriate events to demonstrate how easily concealed the handguns were. This occurred even for media events staged in Washington, D.C., for the benefit of the Maryland suburban electorate.2 With few permits to carry concealed firearms and sharp restrictions on unlicensed carrying - and the curb on pro-gun activities by police - only one side could really address the issue of concealability.
Prior to that campaign, the signing ceremony in Annapolis, Maryland, for the bill which would ban "certain handguns" and lead to the Question #3 referendum, featured state troopers from five states: Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Delaware. All were armed. The ceremony was perceived by the bill's sponsors as a show of support for the legislation. It was announced they were endorsing such legislation in the neighboring states which lacked it. Maryland law prohibits lobbying during duty hours, and prohibits out-of-state police officers from carrying firearms except in the line of duty. Most state laws would prohibit a police officer from lobbying while on duty.
In addition, while Maryland is one of the seven states in the nation without some constitutional provision protecting the right to keep and bear arms, all of the surrounding states represented have such a constitutional right. In the case of West Virginia and Delaware, the constitutional provision was written in the 1980s; Virginia's is two decades old; only Pennsylvania’s precedes legislative discussions of so-called "Saturday Night Specials." In effect, the officers in question were voicing support for legislation which would clearly violate their state constitutions, and they were unlawfully armed while doing so.
Other on-duty lobbyingOn-duty lobbying need not involve intimidation. It may involve, instead, activities which are unauthorized - even clearly unlawful - but involve law enforcement authority and equipment. LESC's efforts to fight S.49 (FOPA) were aided by BATF employees, whose activities were the ones most - almost exclusively - the target of that bill. Since the administration formally endorsed the bill, BATF subordinates worked outside formal channels. Led by Philip McGuire, mentioned earlier, employees encouraged the police groups to oppose the bill, providing them with arguments, and prepared an internal memorandum for the purpose of leaking that memo to congressmen opposed to S.49 (Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Memorandum from the Director of BATF to the Assistant Secretary, Enforcement and Operations, Feb. 10, 1986. Entered into the record during hearings held Feb. 19,1986 before the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime). In addition to subverting the official policy of the organization which employed them, the memorandum was an inaccurate summary of the provisions of S.49 (Vide infra).
The telecommunications set-up and operated by the federal government for crime-control activities (makes and warrant checks, etc.) were used in April 1986 to spur local police to contact congressional offices in opposition to S.49. In general, it would be considered improper to use tax-supported equipment and on-duty time to lobby - particularly against a measure endorsed by the duly elected administration.
The Maryland campaign similarly involved on-duty campaigning - albeit in support of the administration's views, but still in apparent violation of state law - and used telecommunications equipment to help arrange a pro-Question #3 demonstration (Young, 1989; Amo, 1989; Miles Message Switching to All Agencies from State Police, Pikesville, Nov. 3, 1988). In addition, the Baltimore County police produced a brochure defending the handgun ban, which was used as a referendum campaign tool by proponents of the law (Smithwick, 1989: 58). Such campaign expenditures are illegal, of course.
Some police chiefs have appeared in ads denouncing the NRA for the purpose of raising revenues for Handgun Control, Inc. Some concerns involve the propriety of non-issue related ads, the threat of unfair treatment of those on one or the other side of the chief's statements, and the accuracy of the charges. In addition, two of the uniformed chiefs are from California where state law appears to outlaw appearing in such advertisements in uniform.3
Police "legislating"At the extreme of lobbying is the refusal of law enforcement to take legislative recalcitrance as binding and to virtually enact laws on their own. Some chiefs, unhappy with state-enacted laws regarding the issuance of permits to carry concealed firearms for protection, have talked about becoming more arbitrary in denying them, or adding requirements left out of the legislation (Blackman, 1984 and 1985).
Perhaps the most blatant recent example is occurring in Portland, Maine, where the new police chief, Michael Chitwood, has sent notices to the carry-permit holders that a 19th century city ordinance against carrying arms a night is to be enforced even against them. Chitwood reasons that he opposes the state law on issuing permits, but sees no hope that the legislature will make the law more to his liking. Instead, he is making law on his own by reviving an ordinance which is blatantly invalid (Washington Post, Feb. 5, 1989).
The 20th century state law on carrying would automatically supersede a local ordinance, both by virtue of being chronologically later and of a superior jurisdiction. I n case of conflict, earlier laws are presumed repealed, and local ordinances are presumed preempted by state laws (unless expressly not preempted).
In addition to a state law superseding the old -local ordinance, the voters of Maine adopted a "right to keep and bear arms" amendment during the 1980s, which serves as the basis for the interpretation of the state's law to which the chief objects. Chitwood is, then, threatening to violate state constitutional guarantees by enforcing an ordinance which he knows to be a legal nullity because, he says, the state will not rewrite the law to fit his predilections.
A police chief may have the right to lobby the state legislature, especially with regard to what he believes to be law enforcement issues, but he has no authority to take the law into his own hands in defiance of the legislature and the voters of a particular state.
On the other side, some law-breaking merely involves preferential treatment for friends rather than mistreatment of enemies, and indicates more hypocrisy than harm. San Diego's police chief, Bill Kolander, while posing for HCI ads calling for a national "wafting period," and endorsing California's, evaded California's mandatory 15-day wait to provide a handgun for a friend And Chief Casey of Nashville, similarly posing for anti-NRA ads, evades the state prohibition on carrying handguns for protection by deputizing his friends (Nashville Banner, July 22, 1988).
The credibility of law enforcementSuch evasions of existing law and preferential treatment weaken the credibility of law enforcement spokesmen. Another area of concern is the effort to use the authority of their positions as representatives of law enforcement to lie regarding legislative issues. Such distortions may occur in testimony, in statements to the media, or elsewhere. Since congressmen rely on lobbyists for information on legislative issues, distortions may eventually backfire. Congressmen don't like to be "burned" in public, and may react against the law enforcement, pro-gun control lobby believed to be responsible for this embarrassment.4
The most risk was taken when law enforcement organizations testified on S.49 (FOPA) since the bill had almost nothing to do with local law enforcement.5 There were a number of distortions of the clear meaning of the proposed law, and it is not clear why the law enforcement representatives lied to Congress and the media -unless their real objections would be unconvincing efforts to protect BATF abuses or were motivated by some other factor, such as hostility to NRA, the prime organization supporting S.49.
In that bill, for example, there was a toughening of the mandatory penalties for misusing guns in violent crimes - and the addition of a mandatory penalty for gun use in a drug-trafficking crime -with more stringent penalties for "automatic firearm" misuse. Because some citizens in states with mandatory penalties had risked mandatory punishment for use of excessive force in driving off robbers or burglars, there was an exemption if the individual's crime was self-defensive and not initiated by the individual, and if the court found a substantial injustice would flow. The law enforcement organizations testifying before Congress and the media pretended that such an exemption would somehow protect a bank robber who shot back at police.
In addition, S.49 would have streamlined recordkeeping, limiting the information for firearms transfers to the bound books dealers keep (which is what they actually use for tracing firearms), rather than the Form 4473s, which are not generally filed in a way which would allow their ready use for tracing purposes. S.49 would also have done away with recordkeeping for ammunition sales (which BATF testified were simply not used). Again, the law enforcement spokesmen pretended that these records were essential for enforcement. Form 4473 is not used, but does provide an additional basis for federal charges against an unlawful recipient (to wit, lying on the form), but the testimony was from representatives pretending to represent local law enforcement which has no use for the forms.6
Crime data provide another means for distortion. For example, in citing the number of "gun incidents" in the United States annually, IACP head Jerry Vaughn assumed that 40% of robberies involved guns and that 100% of rapes involve firearms (although the FBI does not collect such data; victimization surveys put the figure near 5%, as do the few states which do collect such data). Nashville Police Chief Joe Casey reported in the August 7,1988, issue of the Washington Post that there were some 418,000 homicides in the previous twenty years (a figure off by about 10%), and that 90% of them were gun-related (a figure off by about 25 percentage points).
For international comparisons, Vaughn compared various cities, pretending they were of equal size, and looking only at the number of homicides. He also pretended the foreign cities' law were always more stringent than the comparative American cities. This meant, for example, comparing Chicago (population 3.1 million) with Toronto (approximately one-fifth the size), and ignoring the fact that Chicago prohibits the purchase or carrying of handguns, whereas it is merely difficult in Toronto. Similarly, Washington, D.C. was compared to Calgary, even though the District bans most handgun ownership and all carrying. In addition, Vaughn ignored the fact that since the Canadian gun law (the basis for the comparison) took effect, the number of homicides in Calgary had risen slightly. No effort was made to even look at the pre- and post-law situation in the various cities or in the nations as a whole. Similarly arbitrarily-selected cities would have shown the U.S. to be safer from homicide. Since Vaughn's goal was restrictions on handguns, he also pretended that the foreign countries he selected over a series of months were relatively lenient with long-gun regulations, a statement that was simply not true.
When Congress, at the last minute, tacked a "freeze" of fully-automatic firearms onto S.49, the LESC against S.49 immediately pretended it was very important, even though its initial suggestions for amendments lacked such a provision (Memo to Members of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, March 3, 1986). And Jerry Vaughn immediately said that "machine guns" were a serious threat, stating that three police officers were killed thus far that year with fully automatic firearms. As it happens, one of the officers was killed the previous year, and the other two were killed with a semi-automatic rifle, not with a fully automatic firearm. Thus the incident used to justify a "machine gun freeze" in 1986 is being used in 1989 to justify a ban on semi-automatic rifles.
Once various law enforcement organizations were firmly in the anti-gun camp, some officers appeared in ads for HCI. Virtually all of these ads insisted that the NRA had attempted to get the mail order sale of handguns legalized, but had been stopped by the concerted effort of HCI and law enforcement. In point of fact, the NRA testified for a ban on the mail order sales of firearms in 1967 and has never wavered from that position. The NRA has never lobbied any Congressman to rescind the mail order ban. Most of the other statements in the ads have distortions of the NRA's position to accompany a few outright falsehoods. While HCI tends to try to belittle the influence of the NRA, anti-gun law enforcement prefers to distort in favor of its power. Thus Hubert Williams, of the Police Foundation, wrote that the NRA had a "$60 million political action committee and scores of full-time lobbyists" (Crime Victims Digest, Sept. 1988). This differs somewhat from the $2-4 million PAC expenditures per two-year election cycle reported to the Federal Election Commission and various state agencies, and the four full-time federal and eight full-time state liaisons employed by the NRA.
In addition to distorting the positions of the NRA, some of the police spokesmen also distorted the nature of congressional voting. Jerry Vaughn wrote that the NRA was a dangerous organization, essentially devoted to being a odds with law enforcement, and was representing the "far right," a notion which would have surprised some of the liberal Democrats who regularly support the NRA, as well as the conservative Republicans whom the NRA has declined to support because their more liberal Democratic opponent was equally good on the gun issue and an incumbent. Vaughn sought to find a tie between the areas of NRA's strength in Congress and areas where various "right-wing kook" groups were strong (IACP News, October 1988). That effort showed one of the problems of losing credibility - particularly with Congress. Vaughn's attack on the NRA, however false or intemperate -might survive; but losing credibility while discussing the persons whom he must convince of the veracity of his statements - namely, members of Congress - undermined his value as a police spokesman.
It is not yet clear whether the same result will come from the insistence of some police spokesmen that the NRA is basically against law enforcement, a view expressed by Hubert Williams as well as Vaughn, and the two previous presidents of the FOP. The notion is an odd one, based on the fact that the NRA has opposed gun laws which would interfere with sportsmen and self-defense gun owners regardless of who supported them, and supported reforms to the Gun Control Act of 1968 even after some police organizations went on record against them. To the police it may have looked like NRA was fighting them; to the NRA, it looked like police organizations were in opposition simply because the NRA was in favor, or vice versa.
The NRA has previously always had fairly close ties with law enforcement, and has lobbied for a number of legislative items generally supported by law enforcement officers, particularly mandatory penalties for persons using guns to commit violent or drug trafficking offenses. In addition, the NRA has trained thousands of police firearms instructors, continuing to hold numerous schools each year, as well as hosting hundreds of police competitive shooting events. There has been no reduction in the NRA's efforts to continue its law-enforcement activities, and no call for officers to leave their police organizations for NRA has continued its standard lobbying in support of pro-police legislation. The October 1988 issue of Keeper's Voice, the newsletter of the I International Association of Correctional Officers, credited the NRA, among others, for last minute efforts which saved the Public Safety Officers' Death Benefits Amendment of 1988.
Drug wars and waiting periodsDuring most of the past decades, waiting periods" have been proposed primarily to stop the least determined of criminals. Representatives from such anti-gun organizations as the National Coalition to Ban Handguns (NCBH) and HCI always admitted that the most determined and serious felons would have access to guns, but insisted that a large portion of the alleged gun problem in the nation dealt with half hearted criminals, spur-of-the-moment purchases by those in a temporary rage, and other sales where a minimal background check would find a criminal or mental-history record which would lead to denial of the gun. The notion presumes that the would-be purchaser would accept the result and make no effort to obtain a gun through illegal channels. Or proponents contend that the "waiting period" itself might lead a person to cool off and change his mind about getting a gun, whether for protection, vengeance crime, or anything else spurred by the initial desire. But, all agreed, the determined criminal would always be able to get a gun. The view that the least determined were the easiest to deter, and serious predators were indifferent to laws was, of course, verified by criminologists (Wright and Rossi, 1986).
Then came the discovery of a war on drugs, and the view was changed. Suddenly the notion developed that drug-trafficking gangs wandered around the nation spreading destruction and committing crimes, but that a wafting period and background check would stop them. Curiously, when Police Chief, the IACP's monthly magazine, devoted an issue to the drug problem, gun availability was not an issue. The connection was made elsewhere, and law enforcement organizations and the LESC began to pretend that the wafting period was essential to stop drug-traffickers.
Perhaps the most imaginative statements of that position, not merely reducing the credibility but destroying it altogether, came from George Austin, Jr., of the Virginia FOP, who was quoted in the Washington Post (Aug. 24, 1988) as saying: "Drug dealers are domestic terrorists, killing police officers and our children, and they should be treated as such.... Criminals are simply walking into gun shops in Virginia and purchasing weapons, without any hassle whatsoever. When it is that easy to purchase a gun, most criminals do not take a chance on stealing it or buying it on the black-market. We must do something to put a stop to the easy accessibility to major heavy-duty weapons that drug kingpins are now carrying on the street." The notion that drug "kingpins" and other persons who are willing to murder police officers draw the line at stealing a gun, or that drug dealers try to avoid black-market purchases of handguns is not one which is easy to accept. Clearly, anyone willing to make such silly statements lacks credibility, and lawmakers should question whether such persons may be relied upon when they talk about any other issue.
The criminal's gun"Weapon of choice" is the current operative phrase for describing any firearm one wishes to ban or restrict. A certain amount of credibility is on the line when such a description is used too loosely. Baltimore County Police Chief Neil Behan was in the curious position of testifying before the Maryland legislature in 1988 that the criminals' gun of choice was the small, easily concealable "Saturday Night Special," and in 1989 that it was the rather larger semi-automatic "assault rifle." Either the chief's devotion to the truth is weak or 1988's criminals sought with impressive speed to conform to the spirit of the ban on "certain handguns" enacted in 1988 but not set to take effect until 1990.
Los Angeles has spearheaded the drive to make it appear the semi-automatic military look-alikes are the "weapon of choice" for criminals. It was first announced that the Uzis were being used by LA's gangs in May 1985 when Crime Control Digest quoted an officer to that effect (Lt. Sam Dacus, CCD, May 13,1885). Some of the credibility of that statement was undermined by the admission that no such gun had yet been found in the possession of a gang member; it was just an unwitnessed assumption.
But the report has not been given up. Chief Daryl Gates has continued to report that such military look-alikes both handgun and rifle varieties, are the firearm of choice for drug traffickers and gangs in Los Angeles. Unfortunately for the chief's credibility with those who might care about honesty (thus excluding most of the news media), LAPD Detective Jimmy Trahin, who analyzes firearms related evidence which comes into the custody of the department, reported just the opposite. Trahin's survey found that:
... over 4,000 guns that came into the custody of our unit last year, less than 120 would be classified as this military-type weapon. Of those, only ten or less than ten were actually illegally converted to fully-automatic machine gun stocks. Why? Because these military style assault weapons of today are not easily and readily convertible without extensive knowledge of modifications to the weapon and/or substitution of available parts.
Now, in my twelve years in the unit, considering the enormous amounts of firearms that we have taken into custody, and that's over 50,000 1 would say, and these include the ones from the hard-core gangs and from the drug dealers, our unit has never, ever, had one AK-47 converted, one Ruger Mini-a4 4 converted, an HK 91 -93, never converted, an AR-180, never converted, so this media blitz of many of these assault weapons are supposedly military style weapons are being converted to fully-automatic is not true (Unedited transcript of testimony before the California State Assembly, Feb. 13,1989).
Other cities reported similar, or even less involvement. In New York City, police reported that just under 1/2% of crime guns were military-style rifles (White Plains Reporter-Dispatch, March 27,1989).
Even referring to them as "assault rifles" lacks credibility, since military definitions of an assault rifle require that it be lighter and smaller than a standard military rifle, have a medium - rather than a high-velocity round, and have selective fire capability - that is, being able to fire in semi-automatic, fully-automatic, or burst fire modes. Semi-automatic versions lack any but the single mode of operation and are thus not assault rifles. In addition, since they are medium-velocity rounds, generally with a smaller bullet (for example, the AK-47 uses a 7.62 x 39 mm round while the 7.62 x 54 mm rounds are used with the comparable standard military rifle), their "awesome firepower" is less than that of an ordinary .30-'06 or .30-30 deer rifle (NRA, 1988:261-70).
To the suggestion that the awesome firepower comes from the fact that these gangs and traffickers were using larger-capacity magazines to fire more rounds, Trahin's testimony similarly undercut Gates' credibility. Trahin stated an average shooting involved perhaps 3-5 shots; that by drive-by shootings were too fast to allow magazines to be emptied.
Police demonstrations of semi-automatic rifles shattering watermelons or cinder blocks may impress the public, but weaken the credibility of the law enforcement officers. The initial Los Angeles police demonstration of the semi-automatic AK-47's "awesome power," after all, initially showed clean holes being made in an otherwise undisturbed watermelon. It was only when the officer switched to a 9 mm. that the news media were able to combine a shot of the officers firing a AK look-alike with exploding watermelons and cinder blocks, and deceive the public by not noting that such "awesome power" can be achieved with appropriate ammunition in large bore handguns, ordinary hunting rifles, shotgun slugs, and even properly loaded flintlocks. Our founding fathers may have lacked the cinder blocks, but they had the firepower - and were actually working on mufti-shot firearms before the end of the century.
Some law enforcement officers, appalled that criminals have powerful firearms - as do ordinary citizens, of course - have testified that American law enforcement is "outgunned" and that restrictive gun laws, as well as better handguns for law enforcement, are therefore needed. Such was the motivation when the Cleveland City Council, meeting for the purpose of switching the police department to 9mm. semi-autos, decided to do both that and to ban many semi-automatic firearms owned by private citizens.
In one sense, the "outgunned" statement is simply untrue. Law enforcement agencies have access to all firearms ordinary citizens may own; in addition, they have access to fully-automatic and short-barreled versions of firearms available generally only in semi-automatic and long-barreled models to ordinary citizens. In another sense, the statement simply means that officers wearing sidearms are potentially outgunned by persons with larger sidearms or rifles and shotguns. In that regard, the statement is true, but the legislative implication of that credible statement is that all handguns more powerful than those law enforcement chooses as its own must be banned, along with all rifles larger than .22 LR and all shotguns. Even the puny .410 shotgun, with a slug, is more powerful at short range than a .357 magnum revolver (NRA, 1988).
For lobbying purposes, such statements regarding firepower may be effective, if misleading. But the implications are that law enforcement spokesmen perceive the purpose of the criminal law as making the streets safe for law enforcement officers rather than for the general public, and that the general public may have to be disarmed in order to achieve that goal. The argument may well be effective, but may elicit concerns among ordinary citizens that spokesmen for law enforcement may not want to instill. Lying about the meaning or coverage of laws will also undermine credibility. For example, after the Cleveland City Council passed its ordinance, the absent mayor asked his chief of police what guns would be covered, and approved the measure based on his chief's response. When an NRA staffer, Theodore Lattanzio, went to Cleveland and discussed the matter with the chief, it was agreed that more guns were to be banned than the mayor had been assured by law enforcement. Asked why he lied, the chief told Lattanzio that it was necessary to start someplace.
Conclusory commentsThere has been concern expressed periodically in criminological circles about the police and citizens becoming separated, almost hostile (Moore and Kelling, 1983). Those concerns emphasize the dealings between individuals, for the most part, or small groups at the enforcement level - between beat cops and the persons they may come into contact with. The current efforts of law enforcement leaders to present gun owners as a suspect class risks similar and potentially more organizations and law-abiding citizens creating rifts between those law enforcement leaders to present gun owners as a dispute and those favoring the other side, and making working relations uncomfortable even for those who just want to get the job done and are indifferent to a tangential issue.
It is meet and proper that law enforcement officers and organizations get involved in policymaking - especially at the state and local level, which is the level more related to their activities. Such political activity, however, should be within the norms and values of the American political tradition, where parties may disagree without being disagreeable. It is especially important that law enforcement, with a greater power to abuse authority, exercise greater restraint accordingly. And it should also be remembered that the question is not whether a particular idea or group is pro- or anti- law enforcement or pro- or anti- crime.
There is no reason to expect the NRA and various law enforcement organizations or their leaders to have identical politics. In pursuing theirs, however, it is important for law enforcement organizations to remember what the issues are. As IACP President Charles D. Reynolds expressed it in a letter to the NRA Board Member David Caplan (Dec. 29,1988), Jerry Vaughn "personalized the NRA rather than the 'waiting period' as the issue ... it is my plan that the IACP will remain issue oriented and will not personalize issues, nor proclaim that any organization that does not agree with our position is composed of extremists."
While marry may not care how proper or improper, credible or non-credible, the behavior of law enforcement representatives in lobbying on the firearms issue, it should be kept in mind that they may someday shift beyond that issue into ones which actually involve law enforcement efforts to control crime. And with society, spurred by the media, coming to see the drug problem as creating a national emergency requiring the curtailment of constitutional freedoms appropriate to fighting a "war on drugs," or with the need for all potentially involved government departments working under the leadership of a single "czar," there is clear reason to fear a broadening of the activities of law enforcement organizations at the potential expense of ordinary citizens and their liberties.
ReferencesAMO, G. (1989) "A Political Mugging." American Rifleman, 137 (January): 36-37,82, 86.
BLACKMAN, P. H. (1984) "Civil Liberties and Gun-Law Enforcement: Some Implications of Expanding the Powers of Police to Enforce a 'Liberal' Victimless Crime." A paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Cincinnati, Ohio.
BLACKMAN, P.H. (1985) "Carrying Handguns for Personal Protection: Issues Of Research and Public Policy." A paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, San Diego, California.
FYFE, J.J. (1988) "Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform." Justice Quarterly 5 (June): 165-205.
MOORE, M. H., and G.L. Kelling (1983) "To Serve and Protect: Learning from Police History." Public Interest (Winter): 49-65. NRA (1988) NRA Firearms Fact Book. Washington, D.C.
SMITHWICk, P. (1989) "A Gang of Straight Shooters." Baltimore Magazine (January): 36-41 and 58-61.
WRIGHT, J.D. and P. H. ROSSI (1986) "Armed and Considered Dangerous: A Survey of Felons and Their Firearms." Now York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter,
YOUNG, G. and Associates, (1989), %port to the National Rifle Association: Analysis of the Maryland Referendum Campaign, November 1988,
Footnotes1. In editorially supporting the ban on "certain handguns," In a bill which lists nine vague factors to be considered by a board determining which handguns are to be banned -concealability is one factor, but all handguns are concealable; caliber is one factor, but the bill doesn't state whether small, medium, or large is better - and where neither side could be certain of the fate of new handguns, the Baltimore Sun described the measure as the "very model of legislative precision. "
2. During the course of the campaign, the author had occasion to speak to several groups of students, wandering back and forth in front of the classes with an undetected (until drawn) concealed non-working replica of a revolver owned by Theodore Roosevelt, with an overall length of 13' and weighing 40 oz. Handguns am concealable.
3. It is possible, of course, that the chiefs, true to California law and entertainment, were in costume rather than in uniform.
4. One example occurred in the Senate debate on S. 49 when a Senator, relying on HCI, erroneously stated that homicides in Palm Beach County, following enactment of a waiting period, had been reduced by 200%. While often accused of distortions by the press, the Library Journal ("Alarum and Diversions" column, Sept. 15,1988) reported that "the American Library Association lobby and the National Rifle Association lobby are this only ones whose information was considered consistently truthful and reliable by legislators."
5. The only exception was a provision allowing persons not prohibited by federal law from owning guns to drive through states with unloaded guns not readily accessible to the traveler. If the gun was accessible, local law applied, as It did if the person was a felon, addict, or any other prohibited person. And the protection was a defense to gun law prosecution only, not to stops on other violations.
6. One argument was that the record keeping for ammunition was needed In case armor-piercing ammunition was eventually banned, so that police could go back and find out who owned It. Even ignoring the threat of Fourth Amendment violations, that alleged problem was solved, when the time came, simply by requiring record keeping for all armor-piercing ammunition.